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This Article explores the role of the Federal Circuit in the federal
intellectual property regime, as well as in the federal court system, by
identifying and examining a fundamental conflict in the deference the
court accords to two different institutions-the district courts and the
International Trade Commission ("ITC"). This conflict is significant
because patent litigation increasingly occurs in both forums, frequently
in the same dispute. Traditionally, in district court appeals the Federal
Circuit has taken a circumscribed view of its own role vis-d-vis the other
appellate courts and has deferred on a number of issues outside its area
of specialization. This is in stark contrast o the Federal Circuit's stance
in reviewing agencies, where it has consistently demonstrated its
unwillingness to defer to either the ITC or to the United States Patent &
Trademark Office, sometimes in direct contravention of administrative
law principles. The conflict between these two regimes is reflective of
uncertainty about the Federal Circuit's scope of authority and role in the
federal system. On the one hand, its deference in appeals from district
courts seems to reflect doubts about the Federal Circuit's competency
outside of patent law. But on the other, the court's assertion of power
over similar issues in the ITC, even despite administrative law principles
suggesting otherwise, suggests a much more broadly competent and
powerful institution. This Article argues that the conflict between the
two deference regimes has a destabilizing effect and that principles of
administrative law and appellate review suggest it may be wise to
consider harmonizing changes to both.
* Associate, Morrison & Foerster LLP. Many thanks to Mark Lemley for helpful
discussions and feedback on early drafts.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuit sits at the heart of a complex system. It reviews
patent-related adjudications of not one, but two agencies, and it reviews
patent-related litigations from not one, but two types of forum. This
unique institutional design makes the relationship between the Federal
Circuit and these other institutions-the district courts, the International
Trade Commission ("ITC"), and the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("USPTO")-a rich setting for exploring both the fundamental
principles and the nuances of appellate review and administrative law. In
some ways, this richness has been recognized by scholars. A number
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have explored the intricacies of Federal Circuit review of district courts,'
the sometimes curious application of administrative law to the USPTO
and ITC, 2 and the increasing importance of the ITC in patent litigation.3
But these bodies of scholarship largely focus on a single relationship
within the patent system, either between two courts or between a court
and an agency.4 As such, they miss one of the most intriguing parts of
the patent system, which has much to offer for understanding appellate
review, administrative law, and more broadly, the distribution of power
in our federal system-namely, the comparisons and interactions
between these relationships.
This Article explores in tandem two sets of relationships in the
patent system. One consists of the relationships between multiple courts.
The other consists of relationships between courts and agencies. The
analysis starts from two particular relationships: Federal Circuit review
of patent cases from the district courts and Federal Circuit review of
1. See generally, e.g., Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit's Approach to
Choice of Law for Procedural Matters in Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643
(2009); Peter J. Karol, Who's at the Helm? The Federal Circuit's Rule of Deference and
the Systemic Absence of Controlling Precedent in Matters of Patent Litigation Procedure,
37 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2009); Sean M. McEldowney, Comment, The "Essential Relationship"
Spectrum: A Framework for Addressing Choice of Procedural Law in the Federal
Circuit, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2005); Kimberly Moore, Juries, Patent Cases, and a
Lack of Transparency, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 779 (2002); Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit
"Choice of Law ": Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173 (1996).
2. See generally, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the
APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269
(2007); William J. Blonigan, Road Under Construction: Administrative Claim
Interpretations and the Path of Greater Deference from the Federal Circuit to the Patent
Office, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 415 (2007); Thomas Chen, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal
for Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165 (2008); Dennis J. Harney, The Obvious
Need for Deference: Federal Circuit Review of Patent and Trademark Office
Determinations of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 61 (2002);
Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1547 (2011); Amy
R. Motomura, Rethinking the Chenery Doctrine: Lessons from Patent Appeals at the
Federal Circuit, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 817 (2013).
3. See generally, e.g., Robert E. Bugg, The International Trade Commission and
Changes to United States Patent Law, 76 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1093 (2011); Colleen V.
Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 1 (2012); Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of
Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 64
(2008); Christopher A. Cotropia, Strength of the International Trade Commission as a
Patent Venue, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (2011); Robert Hahn & Hal Singer, Assessing
Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of International Trade Commission
Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 457 (2008); Mark A. Kressel, Protecting Intellectual
Property Rights with the ITC, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2011, at 10; Sapna Kumar, The Other
Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529 (2009).
4. A recent exception is Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal
Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791 (2013), which looks at the Federal Circuit's
various inter-institutional relationships and examines the effects of its consolidation of
power with respect to patent law.
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investigations at the ITC. In district court appeals, the Federal Circuit
has in some ways taken a circumscribed view of its power. Under its
"choice-of-law" rules, the Federal Circuit applies the law of the regional
circuit for non-patent substantive matters and procedural matters not
unique to patent law. Such deference arguably reflects a view of the
Federal Circuit as a specialized court having limited institutional
competence. In marked contrast is its approach in reviewing agencies,
including the ITC. There, the Federal Circuit has consistently limited its
deference to the agency, even when it must defy administrative law to do
so. The Federal Circuit largely exercises independent judgment, creating
and imposing on the ITC the same types of substantive and procedural
law that are allegedly outside its competence on appeal from district
courts.
These two relationships can and should be studied together. Both
are issues of deference: although termed "choice-of-law," the Federal
Circuit's application of regional circuit law can be characterized as a
form of "horizontal" deference--deference to a sister institution-rather
than true choice of law. The Federal Circuit's deference to the ITC is the
more traditional, "vertical" form of deference. While each relationship
has existed for decades, recent dramatic increases in patent litigation in
the ITC makes studying the two together more important than ever
before. When viewed together, it is clear that the two deference regimes
conflict in ways that raise fundamental questions about the proper scope
of the Federal Circuit's power and the institutional design of the patent
system.
This Article explores the conflict between the two deference
regimes and its implications for the relationship between the Federal
Circuit, the ITC, and the district courts. Part I describes the increase in
ITC litigation that makes the conflict increasingly problematic and
provides an example of how this conflict may manifest in litigation. Part
II examines in more detail the doctrinal structures that dictate the
relationship between the Federal Circuit and the district courts, and
between the Federal Circuit and the ITC. It then addresses the
interactions between the two relationships, illustrating the implications of
their alignment or divergence on particular issues. In doing so, Part II
demonstrates how the different approaches to the development of law by
the Federal Circuit in ITC and district court appeals can lead to
conceptual and doctrinal inconsistencies, and how the conceptual
inconsistencies destabilize both deference regimes. The goal of this
Article is largely to frame and explore the nuances of these complex
contradictions, rather than to suggest that there might be a simple
solution. Part III does, however, discuss one possible approach in which
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the Federal Circuit would defer more to the ITC and less to the regional
circuits.
I. HOW THE CONFLICT EMERGED
Most patent litigation has traditionally occurred in the federal
district courts under 35 U.S.C. § 281,5 which allows a patentee to assert a
patent in a civil action for infringement.6 Increasingly, however, patent
litigation is occurring in the ITC. Under § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
7
the ITC has the authority to exclude unlawful articles from the United
States.8 Included in the scope of "unlawful articles" are those that
infringe a patent, registered copyright or trademark,9 or other intellectual
5. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012).
6. Id ("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his
patent."). Potential accused infringers may also bring an action for declaratory judgment
against a patentee. See generally Lorelei Ritchie De Larena, Re-evaluating Declaratory
Judgment Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes, 83 IND. L.J. 957, 974-86 (2008)
(discussing how the Declaratory Judgment Act's standards have been articulated and
applied in patent law).
7. TariffAct of 1930 § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012). Section 1337(d)(1) provides:
If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation under this section,
that there is a violation of this section, it shall direct that the articles concerned,
imported by any person violating the provision of this section, be excluded
from entry into the United States, unless, after considering the effect of such
exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the
United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in
the United States, and United States consumers, it finds that such articles
should not be excluded from entry. The Commission shall notify the Secretary
of the Treasury of its action under this subsection directing such exclusion from
entry, and upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through the proper
officers, refuse such entry.
Id.; Eric B. Cheng, Note, Alternatives to District Court Patent Litigation: Reform by
Enhancing the Existing Administrative Options, 83 S. CAL. L. REv. 1135, 1158 n.172
(2010) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)-(f) (2006)).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (2012). Section 1337(a)(1) provides:
Subject to paragraph (2), the following are unlawful, and when found by the
Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provision of
law, as provided in this section: ....
(B) The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the
sale within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or
consignee, of articles that-
(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent or a valid and
enforceable United States copyright registered under title 17; or
(ii) are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a
process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United
States patent
(C) The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the
sale within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or
consignee, of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States
trademark registered under the Trademark Act of 1946.
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property rights,1° making the ITC a powerful tool for enforcing these
rights.
Like much litigation in federal courts, ITC actions typically begin
when a patent holder files a complaint.l If the complaint results in an
investigation,12 both an administrative law judge ("AL") and an
investigative attorney are assigned to the case.'3  The investigation
proceeds with discovery and a formal evidentiary hearing.14 The ALJ, in
an "Initial Determination," then determines whether there has been a
violation of § 337 and if so, the remedy.15 The initial determination can
be reviewed by the full ITC, either at a party's request or sua sponte.16 If
the full ITC does not review the ALJ's initial determination, the initial
determination becomes the ITC's determination.17  The ITC's
determination becomes final after 60 days unless disapproved by the
president for policy reasons.18 The ITC's determination can be appealed
within 60 days of it becoming final, 19 and the Federal Circuit has
exclusive jurisdiction over these appeals.
20
Id.
10. These include mask works, § 1337(a)(l)(D), and designs. § 1337(a)(1)(E). The
statute requires that "an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by
the patent, copyright, trademark, mask work, or design concerned, exists or is in the
process of being established." § 1337(a)(2).
11. § 1337(b)(1); Kumar, supra note 2, at 1555. The ITC can also initiate
investigations itself. § 1337(b)(1) ("The Commission shall investigate any alleged
violation of this section on complaint under oath or upon its initiative."); see also
William P. Atkins & Justin A. Pan, An Updated Primer on Procedures and Rules in 337
Investigations at the U.S. International Trade Commission, 18 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 105, 106 (2010).
12. Complaints do not always result in the ITC opening an investigation. See Atkins
& Pan, supra note 11, at 112 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (2006)). There is initially a
pre-institution investigation to assess whether the complaint is properly filed and contains
all the required information. See id. (citing 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.9 to .10 (2010)).
13. Kumar, supra note 2, at 1555. The investigative attorney acts like another party
in the case, participating in discovery, motions, briefings, and hearings. Atkins & Pan,
supra note 11, at 116 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 210.3 (2010)).
14. Kumar, supra note 2, at 1555 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 210.36(a)(2)(d) (2010)).
15. Atkins & Pan, supra note 11, at 115-16 (citing 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.15 to .42
(2010)); Kumar, supra note 2, at 1555 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 210.42 (2010)).
16. Kumar, supra note 2, at 1556 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 210.43 to .44 (2010)); Michael
Diehl, Does ITC Review of Administrative Law Judge Determinations Add Value in
Section 337 Investigations?, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 119, 120 (2011) (citing 19 C.F.R.
§ 210.43(a), .44 (2010)).
17. USITC, Pub. No. 4212, YEAR IN REVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 14 (2011).
18. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2), 0)(4) (2012); see also Kumar, supra note 2, at 1556.
19. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c); USITC, PUB. No. 4105, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS:
ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, (2009), available at
www.usitc.gov/intellectualproperty/documents/337_faqs.pdf.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) (2012) ("The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... to review the final determinations of
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A. Rising Litigation in the ITC
Litigation in the ITC has increased dramatically over the past
decade. In the 1990s, the ITC conducted an average of 10.3 patent
actions per year under § 337.2. In the 2000s, the average number had
increased to 25.4 per year.22 The number of patent actions under § 337
has reached even higher numbers since then, with 55 in 2010 and a
record 68 in 201 1.23 Although the number has since decreased from its
peak in 2011, it remains high, with 37 patent actions in 2012, 39 in 2013,
and 37 in 2014.24 Just under half of ITC patent cases proceed all the way
to judgment.25 Figure 1 below shows the yearly figures for § 337 actions
and § 337 actions involving patent rights.26
the United States International Trade Commission relating to unfair practices in import
trade, made under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1337).").
21. This calculation is based on ITC data available at 3371nfo-Unfair Import
Investigations Information System, USITC, http://pubapps2.usitc.gov/337extemal/ (last
visited Mar. 28, 2015). The database's summary of each investigation was analyzed to
determine whether the investigation involved claim(s) based on patent, copyright,
trademark, or trade secret. See also Hahn & Singer, supra note 3, at 460 (finding an
average of 10 cases per year in the 1990s).
22. This calculation was determined as described in note 21, supra. See also Hahn &
Singer, supra note 3, at 460 (finding an average of 23 cases per year since 2000).
23. This calculation was determined as described in note 21, supra.
24. This calculation was determined as described in note 21, supra. See also
Michael G. McManus, Section 337 Caseload and Win Rate Revert to Norms, PATENTLY-
0 (Oct. 30, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/10/section-337-caseload-and-win-
rate-revert-to-norms.html (reporting the number of patent actions under § 337 for the
years 2008-2012).
25. See Mark Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CAL. L. REv. 463,
474 n.60 (2012) (citing Chien, supra note 3, at 64; Hahn & Singer, supra note 3, at 475
tbl.1) (reporting Hahn & Singer's finding that 45% of ITC patent cases settle, and
complainants voluntarily withdraw their complaints in an additional 11%, and reporting
Chien's finding that 44% of ITC patent cases went to judgment). In contrast, far more
district court cases end in settlement-around 80-90%. See John R. Allison, Mark A.
Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99
GEO. L.J. 677, 689 tbl.5 (2011) (in a random sample, finding a settlement rate of 90.50%
for claims based on highly litigated patents and 84.00% for claims based on once-
litigated patents). Cf Chien, supra note 3, at 98 n.180 (among district court cases with
ITC counterparts, finding that 87% settled).
26. Although § 337 investigations can involve a range of intellectual property rights,
the majority involve patent rights. Atkins & Pan, supra note 11, at 107-09. An analysis
of ITC data available at 3371nfo-Unfair Import Investigations Information System, supra
note 21, indicates that of the § 337 investigations through December 31, 2014, 90%
involved patents, 3% involved copyright, 12% involved trademark, and 5% involved
trade secrets.
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This marked rise in ITC litigation has caught he eye of practitioners
and academics alike. One commentator has called the ITC the "hottest
new battleground for patent infringement disputes,"28 and another has
said that "all patent litigators and in-house patent counsel should be
familiar with the ITC's Section 337 authority.,29 These commentators
point to several reasons for the recent surge in ITC investigations,
including available remedies, speed, and patentee-friendliness.
Although the ITC has a more limited set of available remedies than
district courts-it cannot award damages3°-patentees frequently turn to
the ITC because it is more likely to issue an injunction against an alleged
27. The number of § 337 investigations instituted per year is available at Number of
Section 337 Investigations Instituted By Calendar Year, USITC,
www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/cy_337_institutions.pdf (last visited
Mar. 28, 2015). The number of § 337 patent investigations instituted each year were
determined as described in note 21, supra.
28. Kressel, supra note 3, at 10.
29. Peter S. Menell, The International Trade Commission's Section 337 Authority,
2010 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 79, 79 (2010); see also Kressel, supra note 3, at 10 ("[I1f
your practice involves intellectual property you will soon find yourself litigating [in the
ITC].").
30. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1556.
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infringer. In eBay v. MercExchange,31 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
district courts must apply the four-factor equity test for injunctions used
in other contexts, rather than issue injunctions nearly automatically upon
a finding of infringement, as they had in the past.32 But the Federal
Circuit has held that eBay does not apply to the ITC.33 Instead, a finding
of a § 337 violation is almost certain to result in injunctive relief.
34
Increasing ITC litigation is also commonly attributed to the speed of
the proceedings. Section 337 dictates that the ITC "conclude [its]
investigation and make its determination . . . at the earliest practicable
time after the date of publication of notice of such investigation,"35 with
limited time allowed for discovery.36  Lengthy proceedings over
jurisdiction are also largely eliminated because ITC jurisdiction is based
on the act of importation into the United States.37 These factors mean
that ITC investigations conclude in about half the time of district court
proceedings, 38 taking less than one and a half years on average.
39
The ITC has also been perceived as a more favorable venue than
district courts for patent holders. Multiple studies have suggested that
higher percentages of patentees prevail in the ITC as compared to in
district courts.4 °  Other evidence suggests, however, that the ITC's
31. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
32. Id. at 391.
33. Spansion, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
34. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1557; see also Chien, supra note 3, at 99; Hahn &
Singer, supra note 3, at 482-83 (citing DONALD KNOX DUVALL ET AL., UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND THE ITC § 7:20 (2005)). See generally Chien & Lemley, supra note 3
(discussing the rules the ITC currently uses to determine whether to grant an injunction
and arguing that the ITC has and should use flexibility within those rules to adjust the
remedies it grants, rather than nearly automatically issuing injunctions). Even when an
ITC investigation does not go through to completion, the greater threat of injunctive relief
can lead to advantages in settlement negotiations. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 3, at
462.
35. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (2012).
36. See Menell, supra note 29, at 86.
37. Cotropia, supra note 3, at 5 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (2006); Hahn &
Singer, supra note 3, at 461; Kumar, supra note 3, at 535).
38. Id. at 6 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1); Chien, supra note 3, at 101-02).
39. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, FY 2015-2016
AND ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT, FY 2014, at 11 (2015), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/documents/usitc_2015-2016_appand 2014_aprfinal.pdf
(reporting the average length of investigations concluded on the merits as 18.4 months in
fiscal year 2010, 13.7 months in fiscal year 2011, 16.5 months in fiscal year 2012, 19.7
months in fiscal year 2013, and 17.1 months in fiscal year 2014).
40. A study comparing outcomes in patent cases in the ITC and district courts
between 1975 and 1988 found that patent holders prevailed in 65% of cases in the ITC,
compared to only 40-45% in the district courts. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 3, at 473.
A study including more recent data similarly found that patent holders prevailed in 58%
2015]
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apparent patentee-friendliness may actually be a result of selection bias:
among cases brought in both the ITC and a district court, the difference
in win rates is not statistically significant.4' But even if the perception of
the ITC as more patentee-friendly is inaccurate, it may still be driving
patentees to litigate before the agency. Moreover, there are some
substantive differences making patent owners more likely to prevail in
particular circumstances. For example, certain defenses to patent
infringement do not apply in the ITC.42
Increasing litigation in the ITC raises a number of concerns.
Previous commentators have noted divergences in substantive patent law
between the ITC and district courts, most notably, the greater availability
of injunctions in the ITC for non-practicing entities.43 This Article will
address a divergence that has gone unnoticed: that between the
deference regimes accorded by the Federal Circuit to the two institutions.
B. An Example of Conflict Between Deference Regimes
Consider the following example, which illustrates how the rise of
patent litigation in the ITC can bring the deference regimes into conflict.
In In re the Regents of the University of California,44 the Federal Circuit
addressed a petition for a writ of mandamus arising out of multidistrict
patent litigation proceedings involving the University of California,
Genentech, and Eli Lilly. 45 Genentech sought to depose three in-house
attorneys from Eli Lilly who had collaborated with University of
California patent attorneys on the prosecution of a patent involved in the
litigation, which was owned by the University of California but licensed
to Eli Lilly. 46  The university argued that the communications about
which Genentech sought testimony were protected by attorney-client
privilege,47 but the district court disagreed and granted Genentech's
of ITC cases, while only 35% prevailed in district court cases. See Chien, supra note 3,
at 96-97 (analyzing cases from 1995 to mid-2007).
41. Chien, supra note 3, at 96-97 (analyzing cases from 1995 to mid-2007).
42. Hahn & Singer, supra note 3, at 461-62; see Kinik Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the defenses under
§ 271(g)(1) and (2) of the Patent Act involving products made by patented processes do
not apply to § 337 actions in the ITC).
43. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
44. In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
45. Id. at 1388.
46. Id. at 1388-89. Patent "prosecution" is the process by which a patent is
obtained, through the USPTO. See Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in
Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 180, 182-84 (2007).
47. In reRegents, 101 F.3dat 1389.
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motion to compel the deposition testimony.48 The university petitioned
the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus to the district court to vacate
the order granting the motion.49 In assessing whether to grant the writ of
mandamus, the Federal Circuit examined the scope of attorney-client
privilege. Most circuit courts would have done so as a matter of the law
of their own circuit. The Federal Circuit, however, looked instead to the
law of the Seventh Circuit, stating that it looks to the law of the regional
circuit for procedural issues not unique to patent law.50 Ultimately,
based on its application of Seventh Circuit law, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the communications were protected and granted the
writ."
Around the same time as the multidistrict litigation, Genentech filed
a complaint with the ITC seeking an investigation under § 337, based on
allegations that two companies ("BTG" and "Novo") were infringing
four of its patents.52 All four had been asserted by Genentech in the
multidistrict patent litigation involving Eli Lilly and the University of
California. In the district court litigation, Genentech had inadvertently
produced 12,000 pages of documents it considered privileged.54 The
district court ruled that this inadvertent disclosure had waived any
privilege as to the documents.55 After BTG learned of the district court's
ruling, it requested that Genentech produce those same documents in the
ITC proceeding, but Genentech refused.56  The ALJ "carefully
considered the language of the district court's ruling ' 57 to assess whether
the waiver was limited to the district court proceeding or constituted a
general waiver. He concluded that "that the documents in issue were
found not to be privileged by the [multidistrict litigation] Court and
therefore any privilege has been waived," and that he could "find nothing
in the [multidistrict litigation] Court's opinion that states the waiver as to
48. Id. at 1387-88. The district court found that the communications were not
protected by attorney-client privilege because either the privilege had been waived or it
had never vested. Id.
49. Id. at 1387.
50. Id. at 1390 n.2 ("For procedural matters that are not unique to patent issues, [the
Federal Circuit] appl[ies] the perceived law of the regional circuit."). This "choice-of-
law" doctrine is discussed in more detail in Part II.A.
51. Id. at 1390-91.
52. See Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1412-13 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
53. Id. at 1412-13.
54. See id. at 1413.
55. See id.
56. See id. BTG and Novo argued that they were entitled to the documents due to
the finding of waived privilege in the district court; Genentech refused to disclose the
documents, saying that the district court's ruling did not apply in the ITC and pointing to
the protective order in the district court litigation. Id.
57. Genentech, 122 F.3d at 1416.
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the documents in issue means that the documents can be seen only by
UC and Lilly attorneys."58 Thus, the ALJ "gave full force" to the district
court's ruling and held that it applied in the ITC proceeding.59 The ALJ
therefore ordered Genentech to produce the documents.6° Ultimately, the
ALJ issued an initial decision which found a violation of § 337 but
dismissed Genentech's complaint with prejudice.6' The ALJ denied
Genentech relief as a sanction for several discovery violations, one of
which was not producing the documents until it was ordered to do so.
62
After the ITC denied review on this portion of the AL's initial
determination, Genentech appealed to the Federal Circuit.63 With respect
to the issue of privilege, Genentech argued that the ALJ was wrong in
finding that the waiver applied in the ITC proceeding, and therefore, it
was not obligated to produce the documents.64  As such, Genentech
argued, the sanction was an abuse of discretion.65 BTG and Novo
countered that the ALJ had been correct in determining that the waiver
applied to the ITC.66 Upon review, the Federal Circuit rejected
Genentech's argument that the waiver was limited to the district court
proceeding. 67 The Federal Circuit stated that some courts had recognized
limited waiver doctrines, but "[tjhis court, however, has never
recognized such a limited waiver."68 Thus, in evaluating Genentech's
argument, the Federal Circuit appeared to be determining the scope of
58. Certain Recombinantly Produced Human Growth Hormones, Inv. No. 337-TA-
358, USITC Order No. 129, 1994 WL 930226, at *2 (July 15, 1994); see also Certain
Recombinantly Produced Human Growth Hormones, Inv. No. 337-TA-358, USITC Pub.
2869, at 30 (Mar. 1995) (Final).
59. Genentech, 122 F.3d at 1415.
60. See id.
61. Seeid. at 1414.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1411, 1414.
64. See Genentech, 122 F.3d at 1415. Genentech did not challenge the district
court's finding of a waiver; rather, it challenged the application of the waiver to the ITC
proceeding. See id. at 1416. Genentech also argued that the district court's protective
order (which stated that inadvertent production did not waive privilege, if promptly
followed by a request for return) limited the waiver to the district court litigation. See id.
at 1417. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument. See id. at 1418.
65. See id. at 1414.
66. Id. at 1415. BTG and Novo also argued that that Genentech could not
collaterally challenge the district court's finding before the Federal Circuit because it had
not done so before the AL. Id.
67. See id. at 1416-17.
68. Id. at 1417. The court described:
A small number of courts have recognized ... a limited waiver that enables the
attorney-client privilege to survive certain breaches of confidentiality. This
court, however, has never recognized such a limited waiver. Moreover,
Genentech has presented no compelling arguments as to why we should apply
such a limited waiver theory in this case.
Id. at 1417 (internal citations omitted).
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the waiver under Federal Circuit law.69 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the ALJ had not erred in finding that the privilege had
been waived for the ITC proceeding.7 °
This example illustrates how easily the rise of patent litigation in the
ITC might create inconsistent situations in which the Federal Circuit
defers to regional circuits on an issue (here, attorney-client privilege) on
appeal from the district court, but in a related case applies its own law on
a similar issue (here, waiver of privilege) on appeal from the ITC.
Moreover, this example suggests how a troubling circularity may arise
when an ALJ adopts a district court ruling or looks to the district court
for guidance. In the ITC proceeding, the ALJ gave "full force to [the
district court's] ruling" of waiver and held that the district court's finding
applied in the ITC proceeding.7 On appeal from the ITC, the Federal
Circuit upheld the ALJ's adoption of the district court's ruling.72 Had the
district court's finding of waiver been directly appealed to the Federal
Circuit, presumably it would have been evaluated under Seventh Circuit
law, as it had in In re the Regents of the University of California.73 But
instead, the district court's ruling was followed by the ITC, whose
decision was in turn reviewed by the Federal Circuit under Federal
Circuit law. This outcome is, at best, unnecessarily confusing and at
worst, reflective of deep uncertainty about the Federal Circuit's scope of
authority.
The Genentech cases also illustrate the particular risk of parallel
litigation. A patent holder may litigate in parallel in district court and the
ITC. 74 Alternatively, because patent-related determinations in the ITC
do not have preclusive effect on district court litigation, a patent holder
can follow a § 337 complaint with a suit in federal district court.75 In an
69. See also Genentech, 122 F.3d at 1415 (citing to treatises and Federal Circuit
cases regarding the attorney-client privilege generally: Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450,
1451 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (in banc); Am. Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745 (Fed.
Cir. 1987);- Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
The court did mention the law followed by other circuits regarding the privilege, but it
did so clearly only for reference, not in deference to it. See id. at 1415.
70. Id. at 1418.
71. Id. at 1415.
72. Id. at 1415-18.
73. In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
However, it is worth noting that the Federal Circuit does not always defer to the regional
circuit on questions of privilege. Ted Field has described the Federal Circuit as deferring
to the regional circuit "by default" for issues of attorney-client privilege, waiver of
privilege, and the scope of waiver, but as applying Federal Circuit law in situations in
which the issue involves substantive patent law. See Field, supra note 1, at 664-68.
74. But the district court litigation may be stayed until completion of the § 337
action. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1557.
75. See id. However, district court decisions on infringement do have preclusive
effect in the ITC. Id. at 1557 n.51.
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empirical study of § 337 patent actions in the ITC from 1995 through
mid-2007, Colleen Chien found that at least 65 percent had
corresponding cases in district courts.76 The Genentech cases illustrate
how easily similar issues involving the same set of facts might reach the
Federal Circuit on appeal from each forum, and how the Federal Circuit
might then apply regional circuit law in one and Federal Circuit law in
the other.
The conflict between the deference accorded in appeals from the
district courts and from the ITC leads to two types of inconsistency. The
first type is doctrinal inconsistency. That is, on a particular issue, the law
applied by the Federal Circuit in an appeal from the ITC may be
different, in a potentially outcome-determinative way, from the law
applied in an appeal from a district court. The second type of
inconsistency is conceptual inconsistency. The Federal Circuit has, and
continues to develop, a body of law on certain issues that it applies in
appeals from the ITC. Yet, when many of those same issues arise in the
district courts and are addressed on appeal, the Federal Circuit will
proclaim that they fall outside its area of expertise and defer to the
regional circuit.
In many ways, conceptual inconsistencies are more troubling, even
though the substance of the law may be the same. The federal court
system is accustomed to some doctrinal inconsistencies between circuits,
and between federal and state courts. There are also doctrinal
inconsistencies between patent law in the ITC and in district courts.
77
Conceptual inconsistencies, on the other hand, suggest the existence of
fundamental uncertainties about the proper role and competence of the
Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit's deference to the regional circuits
on matters not closely related to the Federal Circuit's exclusive
jurisdiction has been suggested to "embod[y] a common sense
recognition of the longstanding experience of the regional circuits in
dealing with the matters common to their jurisprudence.78 Underlying
76. Chien, supra note 3, at 92. When there was a corresponding district court case,
the ITC investigation was instituted on average 6.6 months after the district court case
was filed. Id. at 93. In 85% of these instances of parallel litigation, the same party
initiated both actions. Id. In an earlier study, Robert Hahn and Hal Singer found 32
instances of patent disputes that were litigated in both the ITC and in the district courts
between 1975 and 1988. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 3, at 480.
77. See, e.g., supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
78. Brian Dean Abramson, A Question of Deference: Contrasting the Patent and
Trademark Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, 29 TEMP. J. ScI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 1, 5
(2010). This deference has also been suggested to anticipate reciprocity in the form of
recognition of the Federal Circuit's specialized expertise. Id. at 5-6 ("By acknowledging
the mastery of the regional circuits over the local law within their bailiwick, the Federal
Circuit may signal an expectation that its mastery of its own jurisdiction should be
recognized by the regional circuits.").
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this recognition is the idea that the judges of the Federal Circuit are
patent specialists and that they are not competent to develop their own
interpretations of federal law on procedural and other substantive areas
of law.79 But even if the specialized competency of the Federal Circuit
was at one point a legitimate basis for deference to regional circuits, the
rise of intellectual property litigation in the ITC raises questions as to its
legitimacy. From a practical perspective, if the Federal Circuit has sole
responsibility for developing doctrine in a range of non-patent
substantive and procedural issues in appeals from the ITC, the argument
for Federal Circuit deference in appeals from district courts cannot rest
simply on issues of competency.
The potential for both conceptual and doctrinal inconsistencies
increases with the rise of ITC litigation. As more cases are litigated in
the ITC and then appealed to the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit's
body of law on substantive and procedural issues will grow to include
more and more issues on which it defers to regional circuits in district
court appeals. With the same issues being litigated in both forums,
conceptual inconsistencies are likely to be more visible, and any
doctrinal inconsistencies have greater potential to lead to divergent
outcomes between the two forums in the same controversy.
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE PROBLEM
Part I explained why the conflict between the Federal Circuit's
deference regimes has recently emerged as particularly problematic. But
the underlying doctrinal structure has existed for decades. In district
court appeals, the doctrine is a byproduct of the Federal Circuit's unusual
jurisdictional basis. Unlike the other federal courts of appeals, its
jurisdiction is geographically unbounded and instead based on subject
matter. This leads to unique questions of authority at the district court
level. In ITC appeals, the doctrine is a result of the Federal Circuit's
application of administrative law, which is frequently idiosyncratic and
often deviates from standard jurisprudence.80  In the following
subsections, this Article will discuss the doctrinal structure in appeals
79. See Karol, supra note 1, at 38. Karol explains:
[I]t is reasonable to credit the Rule of Deference with contributing to at least
the appearance that the judges of the Federal Circuit are patent specialists. ...
[T]he Rule suggests that the Federal Circuit is not "competent" to interpret
matters of general federal procedure. This can only increase the perception that
the Federal Circuit is less capable than other courts of equal standing of
handling appeals when it comes to matters outside its supposed area of
expertise.
Id. at 38, 39 (emphasis in original).
80. See Motomura, supra note 2, at 836-37.
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from both institutions and highlight exactly how and why they come into
conflict.
A. Appeals from District Courts
It may come as a surprise to those unfamiliar with patent law that
the Federal Circuit defers to the regional circuit in appeals from district
courts. The rest of the federal court system, under the Circuit Court of
Appeals Act of 1891,8' also known as the "Evarts Act," is divided into
geographically based regional circuit courts that review the decisions of
the lower district courts that fall within their geographic boundaries.82
Subject to the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court, each of the circuits
can independently develop and interpret federal law, with that law being
binding on the district courts within it. 83 The Federal Circuit, however,
has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals of almost all patent cases in any
district court, regardless of the geographic location.84 For this reason,
81. Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 189l, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
82. Schaffher, supra note 1, at 1175 & n.9 (citing 26 Stat. at 826).
83. Id. at 1175 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294 (1994)).
84. Under the jurisdictional statute, the Federal Circuit, rather than the regional
circuit, has appellate jurisdiction of "a final decision of a district court ... in any civil
action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory
counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety
protection." 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a)(1) (2012). Before the Federal Circuit was created in
1982, district court patent cases could be appealed, like most other cases, to the regional
circuit court. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What
Ought We to Expect?, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 827, 828 (2010). This resulted in significant
variation in patent law among the circuits, as well as between the circuit courts, the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA"), and the USPTO. Christopher A. Cotropia,
Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc
Review, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 801, 805 (2010). Some jurisdictions were much more pro-
patentee than others, leading to widespread forum shopping. Id. The variations also
meant that there was significant uncertainty in how litigation in various forums would
adjudicate the rights of patent owners. Dreyfuss, supra, at 828; Cotropia, supra, at 805.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in very few patent cases, leaving
the issues unresolved. Id.
To address these problems, as well as the overcrowding of the regional circuits'
dockets, Dreyfuss, supra, at 838, the Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982 created
the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.); Cotropia, supra, at 804. The Act abolished the CCPA and the upper division of
the Court of Claims and moved most of those courts' dockets to the Federal Circuit.
Harold C. Petrowitz, Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982-and Beyond, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 543, 543, 558 (1983). It also gave the Federal
Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over a number of different types of intellectual property
cases, including, among others, "all appeals of patent cases" from final decisions of
district courts or of the Board of Appeals or the Board of Patent Interferences of the
Patent and Trademark Office, and review of final determinations of the ITC in § 337
actions. Id. at 555-556 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a) (West Supp. June 1982)). The
Federal Circuit was also given exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of certain decisions
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there is a unique question as to the proper authority in district court
patent cases. Should the district court apply the law of the regional
circuit court, or should it apply the law of the Federal Circuit? Courts
and scholars often refer to this question as "choice-of-law," though that
characterization may be somewhat imprecise. The choice is not between
two separate lawmaking entities in the traditional sense of the term
(typically state and federal) but is rather between two interpretations of
federal law. Thus, the question is more accurately described as a choice
between independent judgment and deference.8"
Broadly speaking, the Federal Circuit has adopted a compromise
approach between independent judgment and deference, under which it
sometimes defers to regional circuit law.86  Although the exact
articulation of the rule of deference can vary, the Federal Circuit
typically creates its own law in areas within its exclusive jurisdiction,
while deferring to the regional circuit court on other matters.
8
7
Generally, this means that the Federal Circuit applies its own law for
substantive patent issues, but it applies the law of the regional circuit for
"procedural matters that are not unique to patent law"88 and for non-
patent substantive federal law, such as copyright and bankruptcy.
89
In an early definition, the Federal Circuit defined "procedure" as
"'the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
disregard or infraction of them"' 90 and "'the machinery for carrying on
the suit' or 'the modes of conduct of litigation and judicial business."' 91
The court said that substantive law, in contrast, "'relates to rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action.',9 2 Since then, the Federal
Circuit has used "virtually countless formulations" to describe the
from courts and boards, dispute resolutions, and agency actions. Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 769, 770 n.2 (2004).
85. Schaffner, supra note 1, at 1175 n.8. However, the Federal Circuit's "choice-of-
law" doctrine is distinguishable from "deference" in the sense that in the case of Federal
Circuit "deference" to regional circuits, it is merely applying regional circuit law, without
actually adopting it. In this way the Federal Circuit's deference to regional circuits is
more akin to traditional "choice-of-law," where one court may apply another court's law
without adopting it.
86. Id. at 1178.
87. Abramson, supra note 78, at 2-3.
88. Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
89. Karol, supra note 1, at 4-5. Like other federal courts, the Federal Circuit also
applies state law when appropriate.
90. Panduit Corp v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 n.12 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (per curiam) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
91. Id. (quoting Jones v. Erie R.R., 140 N.E. 366, 368 (Ohio 1922)).
92. Id.
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procedural issues on which it will defer.93 These formulations generally
rely on a judgment of the relative uniqueness of an issue to patent law,
though some rely more on bright-line rules, such as the court's
description in Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical94 that its "practice
has been to defer to regional circuit law when the precise issue involves
an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the local
rules of the district court. 95
Given these numerous formulations of the rule, whether the Federal
Circuit will defer to the regional circuit court on a particular issue has
proven difficult to predict. The Federal Circuit has deemed some
procedural issues sufficiently tied to substantive patent law for the court
to develop its own law. These include the constitutional due process
analysis in determining personal jurisdiction,9 6 whether two claims for
patent infringement are identical for the purposes of claim preclusion,97
whether a post-verdict motion is a prerequisite to appellate review of a
jury verdict for sufficiency of evidence,98 and whether a preliminary
injunction should be issued.99 Application of the rule has also been
somewhat convoluted with regard to non-patent substantive law, with the
Federal Circuit creating its own law in some areas, such as regarding
antitrust claims based on.the bringing of a patent infringement suit.00
93. McEldowney, supra note 1, at 1666.
94. Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
95. See id. at 857.
96. See Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (quoting Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) ("[W]e apply
Federal Circuit law because the [personal] jurisdiction[] issue is 'intimately involved with
the substance of the patent laws."'); Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21
F.3d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Field, supra note 1, at 672-73.
97. See Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 525 F.3d 1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Hallco Mfg. Co. v. Foster, 256 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) (describing
whether two claims for patent infringement are identical for the purpose of claim
preclusion as a "claim preclusion issue that is 'particular to patent law').
98. See Biodex, 946 F.2d at 858-59 ("The issue at hand, albeit procedural, bears an
essential relationship to matters committed to our exclusive control by statute, the
appellate review of patent trials.").
99. See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 n. 12 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Because the issuance of an injunction pursuant to [§ 283] enjoins 'the violation
of any fight secured by a patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable,'
a preliminary injunction of this type, although a procedural matter, involves
substantive matters unique to patent law and, therefore, is governed by the law
of this court.
Id.; see also Field, supra note 1, at 668-72.
100. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). The Federal Circuit's decision in Nobelpharma was a significant departure
from its earlier jurisprudence, which had held that the court would defer to regional
circuit law on issues of federal antitrust law. See generally HERBERT HOvENKAMP ET AL.,
IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
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Even when the Federal Circuit has declared that it applies Federal Circuit
or regional circuit law on a particular issue, the court does not always
follow its own articulated rules.10 1
Despite the unpredictability of the court's articulation and
application of these rules, the general outlines can be illustrated by
Figure 2 below, which shows the Federal Circuit's relative power as a
function of the type of legal question.





z # , PATENT









Figure 2. Federal Circuit power in district court appeals
In Figure 2, procedural questions lie on the left, and substantive
questions lie on the right. The court's relative power on review (whether
it exercises independent judgment or defers) lies along the radial axes for
each type of legal question. The areas extending furthest outward along
the radial axes-procedural law particular to patent law, and substantive
PROPERTY LAW § 5.3 (2012) (discussing Federal Circuit choice-of-law doctrine regarding
antitrust before and after the Nobelpharma decision).
101. See Field, supra note 1, at 654-59.
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patent law-represent areas in which the Federal Circuit exercises
independent judgment and thus has the most power. The areas lying
closer to the center point--other areas of procedural and substantive
law-represent areas in which the Federal Circuit defers and thus has
less power. In these areas, the Federal Circuit imports law from other
circuits (and in some cases from the states),°2 which it then applies to the
district courts. Thus, as can be seen in Figure 2, the Federal Circuit is
generally powerful with respect to patent-specific law on appeal from
district courts, but it is significantly less powerful in other areas.
B. Appeals from the ITC
The contours of the Federal Circuit's power on appeal from the ITC
are significantly different from those on appeal from the district courts.
Under administrative law doctrine, deference to agencies varies by issue.
Policy decisions and exercises of discretion by an agency are given
significant deference under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.10 3
Findings of fact during a formal adjudication or rulemaking are reviewed
under the "substantial evidence" standard.104  Findings of fact during
informal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking are reviewed
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.'°5
With respect to determinations of law, for agency interpretations of
an unclear statute, the default deference derives from Skidmore v. Swift
& Co.10 6 Skidmore deference gives an agency's decision weight based
on "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade."'1 7 However, if Congress
has "delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and . . . the agency interpretation claiming deference
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority," the agency
interpretation of an unclear statute receives greater deference,'0 derived
102. The Federal Circuit addresses trade secret law on appeal from the district courts
as a matter of state law. Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg., 285 F.3d 1353,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also TianRui Grp. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 661 F.3d
1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In Figure 2, the import of state law, rather than federal law,
is depicted as closer to the center point of the figure than deference to a regional circuit
court.
103. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
104. § 706(2)(E).
105. § 706(2)(A).
106. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see Benjamin & Rai, supra note
2, at 295.
107. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
108. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
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from Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc.'0 9 Granting
Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation gives the agency
significantly more power. When an agency interprets its own regulation,
its interpretation is generally granted even more deference, derived from
Auer v. Robbins11° Under Auer deference, the agency interpretation
receives "controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.'
1
How these general principles are or should be mapped onto Federal
Circuit review of ITC decisions is not entirely straightforward. The
analysis is complicated by a web of various kinds of authorities in ITC
proceedings, as well as by incomplete discussion by the Federal Circuit
of why it is applying certain standards of review, or even what standards
of review it is applying. That said, the Federal Circuit has made some
explicit statements as to standards of review and the application of
administrative law to review of ITC decisions. For instance, the Federal
Circuit has explicitly stated that, as dictated by the APA, it reviews the
ITC's factual findings under the "substantial evidence" standard."2
Because a § 337 investigation is a formal adjudication," 3 this is
consistent with standard administrative law.
With respect to the ITC's legal determinations, the Federal Circuit
has stated that it reviews these de novo".4 and has pointed to the APA as
the source of this standard."5 The Federal Circuit has not explained why
application of the APA would dictate the de novo standard. However, in
the context of patent law, some scholars have suggested that this is
because the ITC assesses whether an article is unlawful under the Patent
109. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
110. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
111. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see Auer, 519
U.S. at 461.
112. See, e.g., Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 831 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); see also Jazz Photo Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1099
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Checkpoint Sys. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 54 F.3d 756, 760 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
113. 19 C.F.R. § 210.36(d) (2014) (providing that § 337 investigations "shall be
conducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (i.e., 5 U.S.C. §§ 554
through 556)").
114. In the context of patent-related legal determinations, see Gen. Protecht Grp., Inc.
v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm 'n, 619 F. 3d 1303, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Spansion, Inc. v. U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003); and Checkpoint, 54 F.3d at
760. For examples of Federal Circuit failure to grant any deference to ITC legal
determinations related to other areas of intellectual property law, see, for example,
Textron, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985); and New
England Butt Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm 'n, 756 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
115. See, e.g., Gen. Protecht, 619 F. 3d at 1306.
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Act, rather than under § 337.116 Because the Patent Act is not
administered by the ITC, the ITC's interpretations would therefore not
receive Chevron deference." 17
Thus, when the Federal Circuit reviews the ITC's determinations of
law regarding patents or other areas of intellectual property law, it plays
a powerful role by creating and applying Federal Circuit law, without
deference to the ITC. The Federal Circuit even creates and applies its
own federal common law in review of trade secret issues and non-
statutory unfair competition, in contrast to its application of state law on
appeal from district courts.'1 8  In TianRui Group Co. v. International
Trade Commission,"19 the Federal Circuit explained that federal trade
secret law should be applied in § 337 proceedings because whether
goods should be excluded is "a distinctly federal concern" and "falls
comfortably into both of the categories that have been described as
calling for the application of federal common law"-when "'a federal
rule of decision is 'necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,"' and
when "Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive
law."'
120
Despite the Federal Circuit's general rule that legal determinations
are reviewed de novo, the court has granted greater deference for agency
interpretations of § 337.121 For instance, in Enercon GmbH v.
International Trade Commission,'22 the Federal Circuit granted Chevron
deference to the ITC's interpretation of the meaning of a "sale for
importation" under § 337's prohibition of "importation into the United
States, the sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after
importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that infringe
116. 35 U.S.C. §§ I to 376 (2012). The Federal Circuit does grant Chevron deference
to ITC interpretations of § 337. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
117. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1562 (citing Process Patents: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 86-87 (2007) (statement of John R. Thomas,
Professor of Law, Georgetown University); Joel W. Rogers & Joseph P. Whitlock, Is
Section 337 Consistent With the GA TT and TRIPS Agreement?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
459, 471 (2002)). For an argument that the Federal Circuit should grant greater deference
to the ITC's determinations, see id. (arguing that the ITC should be accorded Chevron
deference on interpretations of patent law).
118. Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 285 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); see also TianRui Grp. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
119. TianRui Grp. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 661 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
120. Id. at 1327.
121. See, e.g., San Huan New Materials High Tech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
161 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Coming Glass Works v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
799 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
122. Enercon GmbH v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 151 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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a valid and enforceable United States patent."'' 23  Because the ITC
administers § 337 of the Tariff Act within the meaning of Chevron,
24
such deference to the agency's interpretations is aligned with
administrative law doctrine.
Beyond this point, what standard of review the Federal Circuit does
or should apply to ITC legal determinations becomes murkier. Section
337 lays out certain procedural guidelines,25  and the ITC's
interpretations of these procedures would seem initially to merit Chevron
deference, for the reasons explained above.126  Additional procedures
governing § 337 actions are provided by rules similar to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). 127 These rules governing § 337 actions
("Commission Rules") address issues such as service of process,
sanctions, pleadings, motions, summary determinations, discovery, and
temporary relief.128  These rules are promulgated through notice-and-
comment rulemaking under 19 U.S.C. § 1335.129 As such, it would seem
initially that they should generally be granted Chevron deference."3 °
Although the Federal Circuit has not explicitly addressed the deference it
gives to the ITC's interpretations of the Commission Rules, under the
standard administrative law framework, the Federal Circuit should grant
the agency's interpretations Auer deference, which is even more
deferential than Chevron deference.'3' Thus, at least in theory, this
would seem to suggest that the ITC has significant control over the
123. Id. at 1381-83 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that "the ITC is entitled to appropriate
deference to its interpretation of the statute" as "the agency charged with the
administration of section 337," and that the ITC's interpretation of "sale for importation"
was a reasonable interpretation of § 337 that the court "must uphold under the standards
set forth by the Supreme Court in Chevron").
124. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1570.
125. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (2012) (addressing procedures for investigation by
the ITC); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (addressing procedures for determinations and review); 19
U.S.C. § 1337(e) (addressing preliminary relief); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(h) (addressing
sanctions for abuse of discovery and abuse of process); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(k) (addressing
modification or rescission or exclusion or order).
126. See supra notes 108-109 and 121-21 and accompanying text.
127. Daniel F. Solomon, Summary of Administrative Law Judge Responsibilities, 31
J. NAT'L Assoc. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 475, 506 (2011).
128. 19 C.F.R. §§ 201.16, 210.1 to 210.79 (2014). The unofficial rules can be found
online: Section 337 Rules, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N,
http://www.usitc.gov/intellectualproperty/documents/section337_rules.pdf (last visited
Apr. 14,2015).
129. 19 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012) ("The commission is authorized to adopt such
reasonable procedures and rules and regulations as it deems necessary to carry out its
functions and duties.").
130. Cf Thomas J. Fraser, Interpretive Rules: Can the Amount of Deference Accorded
Them Offer Insight into the Procedural Inquiry?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1303, 1325 (2010)
("[A]n agency would almost certainly get [Chevron deference] from a court if it were to
promulgate the rule using notice-and-comment rulemaking.").
131. See supra note 110-11 and accompanying text.
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conduct of its proceedings, with the Federal Circuit playing a less
powerful role.
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that the Federal Circuit in fact
may have much more authority to develop procedural law in ITC appeals
than it initially appears from the straightforward application of Chevron
and Auer. This is because the Commission Rules bear significant
similarities to the FRCP,132 and indeed, a number are "taken almost
verbatim from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'133  Other
Commission Rules explicitly incorporate rules from the FRCP by
reference,134 as do some portions of § 337.135 Even in areas of procedure
in which § 337 or the Commission Rules do not copy or reference the
FRCP, ALJs often look to the FRCP, or to federal case law interpreting
the FRCP, for guidance.1
36
Administrative law doctrines suggest that this pervasive influence
of the FRCP on ITC procedure significantly limits the deference that the
Federal Circuit should accord to the ITC. Under the U.S. Supreme
Court's decisioh in Gonzales v. Oregon,'37 Auer deference does not apply
to "parroting regulation[s]"-those that merely paraphrase the language
of the original statutory language, rather than add an agency's expertise
and experience to formulate a regulation.38  When an interpretation
merely copies the words of the statute, the question "is not the meaning
of the regulation but the meaning of the statute. An agency does not
acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of
using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected
merely to paraphrase the statutory language. '3 When the Commission
Rules directly adopt the federal rules, the ITC is not relying on its own
expertise and experience to formulate a regulation. Similarly, when the
Commission Rules adopt the substance or significant text verbatim from
the FRCP, the agency is making decisions that do not merit Chevron
deference because such decision-making is not an exercise of agency
expertise, even assuming that the formal authority for these decisions is
the authority granted to the ITC under § 1335.
132. Solomon, supra note 127, at 506.
133. Thomas R. Rouse, The Preclusive Effect of lTC Patent Fact Findings on Federal
District Courts: A New Twist on In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litigation, 27
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1417, 1424 (1994); see also Atkins & Pan, supra note 11, at 112
("[T]he Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure . . . are based on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."); Cheng, supra note 8, at 1155.
134. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
136. See infra Part II.C.2.b(ii)-(iii).
137. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).




Thus, when the ITC interprets a rule that parrots the FRCP or
incorporates it by reference, the agency's interpretation of the rule should
receive only Skidmore deference, despite being promulgated under 19
U.S.C. § 1335.140 Similarly, when § 337 incorporates rules from the
FRCP by reference, the ITC's interpretations of the statute should not
receive Chevron deference. And when ALJs look to the FRCP or to
federal case law interpreting the FRCP, these interpretations likewise do
not merit expertise-based eference beyond what. Skidmore requires, and
thus the Federal Circuit should again exercise independent judgment on
review. 141 Thus, because principles of administrative law suggest that
the Federal Circuit should not grant any meaningful deference to the ITC
in these situations, the Federal Circuit should have significant power in
the development of procedural law in § 337 actions.
The contours of Federal Circuit deference to the ITC discussed thus
far are illustrated in Figure 3 below. As in Figure 2, procedural
questions fall on the left side of the graph, while substantive questions
fall on the right side. The court's relative power on review (whether it
exercises independent judgment or meaningfully defers) lies along the
radial axes of each type of question, with the Federal Circuit having the
most power in the areas extending furthest outward along the radial axes.
140. Cf Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 268. There, the Court reasoned that "[s]ince the
Interpretive Rule was not promulgated pursuant to the Attorney General's authority, its
interpretation of 'legitimate medical purpose' does not receive Chevron deference.
Instead, it receives deference only in accordance with Skidmore." Id.
141. Although Skidmore deference is not de novo review, the court is still the ultimate
decision-maker, unlike under Chevron. See JOHN F. DUFFY & MICHAEL HERZ, A GUIDE
TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 131 (2005) (citations omitted)
("Under Skidmore, the court independently interprets the statute; the agency's
interpretation is one factor among many that will affect its conclusion. Under Chevron,
the agency is the decision maker; under Skidmore the court is.").
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Figure 3. Federal Circuit power in ITC appeals
The figure thus illustrates the court's relative power (i.e., exercise of
independent judgment) in the area of substantive intellectual property
law, as well as with respect to any of the numerous procedural rules
relying on the FRCP. In contrast, the Federal Circuit is less powerful
(i.e., defers more to the ITC) in substantive interpretations of § 337,
procedural rules generally, and Commission Rules.
142
C. Comparing Appeals from the Two Institutions
There are some areas of alignment between the Federal Circuit's
power in appeals from the district courts and the ITC, and some areas of
divergence. The normative analysis of the Federal Circuit's deference
regimes is not so simple, though, as suggesting that alignment is
142. Auer deference to the ITC's interpretations of its Commission Rules is shown as
closer to the center point, reflecting the relatively lesser Federal Circuit power.
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desirable and divergence is undesirable. Differences in the Federal
Circuit's power alone are not problematic; appellate courts play different
roles in reviewing lower courts and in reviewing agencies, and some
differences between how the Federal Circuit reviews the ITC and district
courts are both expected and desirable.
Thus, the normative desirability of the Federal Circuit's deference
regimes depends on the relationship between the two regimes-that is,
whether the Federal Circuit defers in both ITC and district court appeals,
exercises independent judgment in both, or defers in one but not the
other-and whether that combination is appropriate for a particular issue.
In some instances, the combination of the deference regimes may be
doctrinally inconsistent in that the law applied by the Federal Circuit
may be different, in a potentially outcome-determinative way, between
an appeal from a district court and an appeal from the ITC. Doctrinal
inconsistencies may or may not be desirable, depending on the context
and perspective; indeed, our legal system is replete with doctrinal
inconsistencies, which are a byproduct of our multi-authority system.
However, more problematic is that in some instances, the combination
may be conceptually inconsistent-that is, the distribution of power is
inconsistent with the principles underlying administrative law, appellate
review, or both.
1. Areas of Alignment
a. Exercise of Independent Judgment on Appeal from Both the
District Courts and ITC
First, consider the situation in which the Federal Circuit exercises
independent judgment on an issue in appeals from both the ITC and the
district courts. This means that the Federal Circuit creates its own law on
appeal from both institutions and, most likely, applies it uniformly across
both institutions upon review. This combination is ideal in areas in
which the appellate court has significant expertise, or in which
uniformity is highly desirable.
Patent law falls into this area of alignment. As discussed above, the
Federal Circuit exercises independent judgment in reviewing substantive
patent law matters, whether on appeal from the district courts or the ITC.
When reviewing district court decisions, the Federal Circuit creates its
own law in areas within its exclusive jurisdiction, which includes
substantive patent issues.143 Similarly, the ITC's patent-related
143. See supra Part II.A; see also Abramson, supra note 78, at 2-3.
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determinations are subject to de novo review, rather than being granted
Chevron deference. 
144
In some ways, it seems appropriate that the Federal Circuit
exercises independent judgment with respect to substantive patent issues
on appeal from both institutions. The Federal Circuit has developed
expertise in patent law, since it hears nearly all patent-related appeals.
Further, the Federal Circuit's formation was intended to bring uniformity
to patent law, in response to widespread variability in patent law between
the circuit courts, and between the circuit courts, CCPA, and the
USPTO.145 Thus, in interpretations of patent law, exercising independent
judgment allows the Federal Circuit's approach to be largely doctrinally
consistent, and arguably conceptually consistent, between appeals from
the district courts and the ITC. Yet, it is worth noting that other
commentators have suggested that such consolidation of power may be
undesirable and that exercising independent judgment over the ITC on
patent issues might be counter to administrative law principles. 
146
b. Deference on Appeal from Both the District Courts and ITC
Next, consider the situation in which the Federal Circuit defers in
appeals from both district courts and the iTC. It is important to
remember that the meaning of "deference" to each institution is slightly
different. When the Federal Circuit defers in appeals from district
courts, the Federal Circuit does not create Federal Circuit law at all.
Instead, it simply acts as though it were the regional circuit court in
deciding these issues. When the Federal Circuit defers in appeals from
the ITC, it defers (to the extent dictated by principles of administrative
law) to the agency's interpretations in deciding what Federal Circuit law
will be. Because the Federal Circuit only creates federal law on appeal
from the ITC, the court's own body of federal law is not susceptible to
having two conflicting strains within it. However, doctrinal
inconsistencies may still exist because different law may be applied in
the two types of appeals.
Some procedural law falls into this area of alignment. As a general
rule, the Federal Circuit defers on procedural law on appeal from both
the district courts and the ITC. Recall that on appeal from the district
144. See supra Part II.B; see also Kumar, supra note 2, at 1566-68 (discussing the
lack of Chevron deference to the ITC's interpretation of the Patent Act in validity and
enforceability decisions).
145. See Cotropia, supra note 84, at 804-06. But see Kumar, supra note 2, at 1583-
84 (arguing that the Federal Circuit's creation was not intended to bring uniformity to
administrative patent decisions).
146. See generally Kumar, supra note 2 (arguing that the Federal Circuit should grant
Chevron deference to ITC determinations of patent validity and enforceability).
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courts, the Federal Circuit applies the law of the regional circuit for
"procedural matters that are not unique to patent law." 147 Thus, in these
areas, the Federal Circuit declines to develop its own procedural law,
deferring instead to the authority of the other circuits. On appeals from
the ITC, the Federal Circuit also defers on procedural law, at least as a
general rule. With the significant exception of incorporation or parroting
of the FRCP, the ITC's interpretations of the parts of § 337 governing
agency procedures should receive Chevron deference, and its
interpretations of the Commission Rules should receive Auer
deference. 148
The areas of alignment between the Federal Circuit's power in
appeals from the district courts and the ITC are illustrated in Figure 4
below, which shows an overlay of Figures 2 and 3.149 The areas of
alignment appear as points where the coloring extends the same distance
along an axis-either the same short distance (indicating low Federal
Circuit power due to deference to another institution) or the same long
distance (indicating high Federal Circuit power due to exercise of
independent judgment).
147. Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
148. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
149. For ease of comparison, the Federal Circuit's power in interpreting § 337 on
appeal from the ITC is not included.
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COMPARISON OF FEDERAL
CIRCUIT POWER IN D1STRICT













Figure 4. Comparison of Federal Circuit power in district court and ITC appeals
2. Areas of Divergence
a. Deference on Appeal from the ITC But Not from District
Courts
In another possible combination of deference regimes, the Federal
Circuit might defer to the ITC on an issue, but on appeal from the district
courts, exercise independent judgment. In these instances, to the extent
that the Federal Circuit deferred to the ITC, it would adopt the agency's
views as its own. In a first variation of this combination, the Federal
Circuit might adopt the agency's views as its own for all purposes, and
thus the agency's view might be imposed on the district courts (that is,
doctrinal inconsistencies would not be permitted). In a second variation
of this combination, despite the Federal Circuit's deference to the agency
in the context of agency review, the Federal Circuit might still develop
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its own law in the context of district court review (that is, doctrinal
inconsistencies would be permitted).
1 50
In many ways, this combination of deference regimes is both
expected and desirable, and is conceptually consistent with
administrative law doctrines. It reflects the assumption of an agency's
greater expertise in dealing with a statute that it administers. Much of
administrative law is founded on the premise that an agency is an expert
in a particular area, and as such, it is the agency and not the courts that
should be making decisions. 51  Thus, in areas in which the agency has
expertise, there is a stronger argument for deference to the agency than to
the district courts. On the other hand, the second variation of this
combination is conceptually inconsistent in that the Federal Circuit
would have law from the context of ITC appeals but decline to apply it to
district court appeals. In any case, the actual instances of the Federal
Circuit deferring on an issue from the ITC and exercising independent
judgment on that issue from district courts are limited. Under the
deference regimes outlined here, this would likely only occur if an issue
specific to ITC proceedings (e.g., certain interpretations of § 337 or
Commission Rules) arose in a district court.
b. Deference on Appeal from the District Courts But Not from
the ITC
Consider the final combination: when the Federal Circuit exercises
independent judgment in appeals from the ITC but defers in appeals from
district courts. Because of the difference in what it means for the Federal
Circuit to defer on an appeal from the ITC or from a district court, this
scenario is not a simple mirror image of the combination above, when
the Federal Circuit defers to the ITC but not to the district courts.
Above, two variations were possible-one in which the agency's view
was imposed on the district courts via the Federal Circuit and one in
which it was not. In contrast, when the Federal Circuit defers on appeals
from the district courts but not from the ITC, the Federal Circuit does not
150. The second variation is arguably more consistent with the fact that, at least for
patent determinations, ITC decisions on patent issues are not binding on district courts.
See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1573. On the other hand, the first variation is arguably more
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court precedent in BrandX, Nat 'l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass'n v. Brand XInternet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005), in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that an agency's interpretation otherwise entitled to Chevron deference is
trumped by a court's prior interpretation only if the statute is unambiguous. Id.
151. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938), which is
described in Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REv. 93, 127 n. 11
(2005) (describing THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS as "[t]he classic statement" of the
agency expertise justification).
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adopt the jurisprudence of the regional circuits as its own, but rather, the
Federal Circuit simply applies it. As such, there is no Federal Circuit
law to impose on the ITC from district court appeals. Thus, the Federal
Circuit must create its own, potentially conflicting, jurisprudence for
application on appeal from the ITC.
This introduces the possibility of doctrinal inconsistencies-that is,
differences in the substance of the law that the Federal Circuit applies in
appeals from district courts versus in appeals from the agency. But more
importantly, it also generates conceptual inconsistencies. The Federal
Circuit develops and applies its own body of law on particular issues on
appeal from the ITC, but it declines to apply that law on appeal from the
district court, instead deferring to regional circuits. Because the ITC
looks frequently to federal court practice, this combination generates
conceptually inconsistent and frequently circular deference regimes. It is
worth noting that the conceptual inconsistency exists regardless of
whether there is a doctrinal inconsistency on a particular issue and,
indeed, even if there were no doctrinal inconsistencies on any issue at all.
As shown in Figure 4, this combination occurs for substantive
issues regarding non-patent intellectual property law. There, the Federal
Circuit creates its own law on appeal from the ITC, while it defers to
regional circuit law (or, in the case of trade secret law, state law152) on
appeal from district courts on these same issues.153 This diverging
combination also occurs for procedural issues in which the ITC turns to
the FRCP or to other federal district court procedures. When the Federal
Circuit reviews issues of procedural law involving the FRCP on appeal
from district courts, it generally defers to regional circuit law.154  In
contrast, as argued above, application of administrative law doctrine
152. See TianRui Grp. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); see also Viscofan, S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 787 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
153. Regarding trademark or trade dress, see, for example, Payless Shoesource, Inc.
v. Reebok Int'l, 998 F.2d 985, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28
F.3d 1192, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994); for antitrust, see, for example, Loctite Corp. v.
Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998); for
copyright, see, for example, Chamberlain Grp. v. Skylink Techs., 381 F.3d 1178, 1191
(Fed. Cir. 2004); for unfair competition, see, for example, Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia
Telecomms. Grp., 900 F.2d 1546, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1990). For an ITC order explicitly
comparing the "choice of law" in ITC and district court appeals, see Certain TV
Programs, Literary Works for TV Production and Episode Guides, Inv. No. 337-TA-886,
USITC Order No. 18, at 12-13 (February 6, 2014). The order discusses how regional
circuit copyright law would have applied to the copyright claim had it been filed in
district court with a patent claim, but how the ITC's proceeding was instead governed by
Federal Circuit copyright jurisprudence. Id.




suggests that when the Federal Circuit reviews issues of procedural law
involving the FRCP on appeal from the ITC, it should apply minimal or
no deference. 1
55
The conceptual inconsistency in such an arrangement can manifest
in peculiar circularities. For example, ITC determinations on these
issues sometimes rely on Federal Circuit opinions in which the Federal
Circuit deferred to the regional circuit. If these determinations were then
appealed to the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit would exercise
independent judgment in reviewing the regional circuit law to which it
had deferred. Several ITC determinations addressing subpoenas provide
a concrete example. In determining whether to grant a motion to quash a
subpoena, the ITC looks to three factors: "(1) the relevance of the
discovery sought; (2) the need of the requesting party; and (3) the
potential hardship to the party responding to the subpoena."1 56 These are
the same factors considered by district courts,1 57 and the ITC has cited to
Federal Circuit opinions for the test. 58 Yet, in the cited Federal Circuit
opinions, the factors are applied explicitly as a matter of regional circuit
law. For example, a 1996 ITC determination cited the Federal Circuit's
opinion in Truswal Systems Corp. v. Hydro-Air Engineering, Inc.'59 for
the test governing quashing subpoenas.1 60 But in Truswal, the Federal
Circuit stated that "[a]n order quashing a subpoena is not unique to
patent law," 161 and thus the regional circuit (Eighth Circuit) law should
be applied.162 Troublingly, it seems that had this been appealed to the
155. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
156. Certain Adjustable Keyboard Support Sys. & Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-670, USITC Order No. 11, 2009 WL 2805215, at *3 (Aug. 26, 2009) (citing
Certain Display Controllers & Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-491, USITC
Order No. 17, 2003 WL 22273570, at *2 (Sept. 26, 2003)); see also Certain Vaginal
Ring Birth Control Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-768, USITC Order No. 27, 2011 WL
6469935, at *2 (Dec. 16, 2011) (citing the same three factors); Certain Video Game
Machs. & Related Three-Dimensional Pointing Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-658, USITC
Order No. 14, 2009 WL 1041376, at *4 (Feb. 27, 2009) (citing the same three factors).
157. See Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng'g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1210 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (citing Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1024 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
158. See, e.g., Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Systems and Components Thereof,
Inv. No. 337-TA-383, USITC Order No. 42, 1996 WL 965375, at *9 (Sept. 6, 1996)
(citing Truswal, 813 F.2d at 1210; Heat & Control, 785 F.2d at 1023).
159. Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng'g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1210 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
160. See Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Systems and Components Thereof, 1996
WL 965375, at *9 (citing Truswal, 813 F.2d at 1210; Heat & Control, 785 F.2d at 1023).
161. Truswal,813F.2dat 1209.
162. See id However, in that case, there was no Eighth Circuit precedent so the court
looked to the law of other circuits and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. The
1996 ITC determination also cited Heat and Control, 785 F.2d at 1024. In Heat and
Control, like in Truswal, the Federal Circuit stated that "[o]n questions relating solely to
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Federal Circuit; the Federal Circuit would have reviewed de novo the
Eighth Circuit law to which it had deferred on appeal from the district
court.
There is a risk of invoking this type of circularity any time that ITC
determinations point to Federal Circuit cases addressing non-patent
substantive law matters, or addressing the FRCP or certain district court
procedures, if the ITC is not precise in how it relies on various
authorities. Instances of the FRCP's influence on ITC procedure are
many, making the possibilities for conceptual inconsistency numerous.
i. Incorporation of the FRCP by Reference
Section 337 itself incorporates by reference several sections of the
FRCP. For instance, under § 337(h), sanctions for abuse of discovery or
process are directly tied to the federal rules. The statute states that the
ITC "may by rule prescribe sanctions for abuse of discovery and abuse of
process to the extent authorized by Rule 11 and Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.'' 163 Similarly, § 337(e)(3) states that the ITC
"may grant preliminary relief ... to the same extent as preliminary
injunctions and temporary restraining orders may be granted under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'164  Section 337(k) allows the
modification or rescission of an exclusion order "on grounds which
would permit relief from a judgment or order under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.'65
Like § 337 itself, the Commission Rules promulgated by the ITC
also incorporate many rules from the FRCP. The federal rules are
incorporated into the Commission Rules regarding discovery
sanctions,166 bonds,16 7 and modification or rescission of exclusion
procedural matters, such as this, that do not directly address issues of patent law, the
Federal Circuit has consistently held that the policies promoting certainty in the law and
stare decisis mandate that the court follow the law of the regional circuit." Heat &
Control, 785 F,2d at 1022 n.4.
163. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(h) (2012).
164. Id. § 1337(e)(3).
165. Id. § 1337(k)(2)(B)(ii).
166. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.27(d)(4) (2014) ("An appropriate sanction may include an
order to pay the other parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the
violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee, to the extent authorized by Rule 26(g) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); 19 C.F.R. § 210.33(b)(6) ("If a party ... fails to
comply with an order.., the administrative law judge... may... [o]rder any other non-
monetary sanction available under Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
For an example in an ITC order, see Certain Composite Wear Components & Prods.
Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-644, USITC Order No. 27, 2009 WL 2218710, at *5
(July 17, 2009).
167. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.50(d)(3) ("In determining whether to grant the motion [for
forfeiture or return of a bond], the administrative law judge and the Commission will be
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orders.'68 Moreover, a number of Commission Rules do not reference
specific rules from the FRCP, but copy significant portions of their
language.169 Unsurprisingly, when the Commission Rules incorporate
rules from the FRCP or copy language from them, ALJs frequently turn
for guidance to case law originating from district court litigation'7o and in
doing so, introduce the risk of circularities.171
ii. Application of the FRCP by ALJs
Furthermore, even when the ITC is not bound to do so by statute or
regulation, its ALJs often look to district court procedures,' 72 particularly
when the Commission Rules do not specifically address a particular
situation."73  For instance, ITC decisions apply Rule 26(b)(3) of the
FRCP regarding the attorney work-product privilege174 and follow
guided by practice under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ...."); 19
C.F.R. § 210.70(c) (providing the same guidance for temporary relief bonds); 19 C.F.R.
§ 210.52(c) (providing the same guidance for "whether to require a bond as a prerequisite
to the issuance of temporary relief").
168. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.76(a)(2) ("[R]elief may be granted by the Commission with
respect to such petition on the basis of new evidence or evidence that could not have been
presented at the prior proceeding or on grounds that would permit relief from a judgment
or order under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
169. For example, in 2013 the ITC issued amendments to Commission Rule 210.27 to
address discovery of electronically stored information that largely copied the language
from the corresponding rule in the FRCP. Paul M. Schoenhard & Stephen J. Rosenman,
New Rules at the ITC Target Efficiency, Require Caution, 86 PATENT, TRADEMARK
COPYRIGHT J. 373, 373-74 (2013). Compare 19 C.F.R. § 210.27(c), with FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2)(B).
170. See, e.g., Certain Muzzle-Loading Firearms & Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-777, USITC Pub. 4404, 2011 WL 5479115, at *39 (Aug. 31, 2011) (looking to
Rule 65 of the FRCP for guidance regarding whether a bond should be required, and
citing a district court opinion, Int'l Equity Inv., Inc. v. Opportunity Equity Partners, 441
F. Supp. 2d 552, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), for the placement of the burden of proof).
171. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
172. Cf Certain Indomethacin, Inv. No. 337-TA-183, Commission Opinion at 4 n.8
(USITC June 30, 1988) ("Although Commission practice is not governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, it often looks to those rules for guidance.").
173. See, e.g., Certain Composite Wear Components and Products Containing Same,
Inv. No. 337-TA-644, USITC Order No. 16, 2009 WL 205132, at *1 (Jan. 22, 2009)
(internal citations omitted) ("The Commission Rules are not specific with respect to
electronic discovery. In such situations, the Commission may look to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for guidance.").
174. See, e.g., Certain Ceramic Capacitors & Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-
TA-692, USITC Order No. 16, 2010 WL 1792304, at *2 (Apr. 19, 2010) ("The attorney
work-product privilege, as codified under Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and as applied in Section 337 investigations, protects from discovery
documents and other tangible things prepared by a party or its counsel in anticipation of
litigation or for trial.").
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federal case law regarding the privilege's scope.175 Similarly, although
the Commission Rules regarding pleading affirmative defenses do not
incorporate or reference the FRCP,176 ALJs have held that the pleading
standard of FRCP 9(b) applies when a respondent in an investigation
asserts certain affirmative defenses, including the often-raised177 defense
of inequitable conduct.178 As another example, Commission Rule 210.19
regarding intervention in an action provides that the AU "may grant the
motion [to intervene] to the extent and upon such terms as may be proper
under the circumstances,"179 but the Commission Rules do not give any
further guidelines for determining whether intervention is appropriate.
To fill the gap, the ITC follows Rule 24 of the FRCP to determine
whether intervention is appropriate. 180 Furthermore, even when the ITC
175. See, e.g., Certain Bulk Welding Wire Containers & Components Thereof &
Welding Wire, Inv. No. 337-TA-686, USITC Order No. 37, 2010 WL 1792278, at *2-3
(Feb. 22, 2010); Certain Network Controllers & Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-
TA-531, USITC Order No. 15, 2005 WL 5009567, at *1 (July 19, 2005).
176. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.13(b) (2014).
177. For district court statistics, see Jason Rantanen, Recalibrating Our Empirical
Understanding of Inequitable Conduct, 3 IP THEORY 98, 98, 106-108 (2013). The
standard for proving inequitable conduct was raised in 2011 by Therasense, Inc. v.
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc), resulting in
fewer assertions of the defense since then. Rantanen, supra, at 106-109.
178. See, e.g., Certain Devices for Mobile Data Commc'n, Inv. No. 337-TA-809,
USITC Order No. 11, 2011 WL 6826778, at *3 (Dec. 23, 2011) ("In prior investigations,
I have held that the heightened pleading standard required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply when a respondent asserts an affirmative defense of
inequitable conduct."); Certain Liquid Crystal Display Devices & Prods. Containing the
Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-782, USITC Order No. 8, 2011 WL 4614979, at *2 (Oct. 4,
2011) (stating the same); Certain Notebook Computer Prods. & Components Thereof,
Inv. No. 337-TA-705, USITC Order No. 12, 2010 WL 4780159, at *1 (Aug. 18, 2010)
(stating the same); Certain Bulk Welding Wire Containers & Components Thereof &
Welding Wire, Inv. No. 337-TA-686, USITC Order No. 21, 2009 WL 4757312, at *2
(Dec. 7, 2009). In Certain Bulk Welding Wire Containers, the ALI points to Rule
210.13(b)(3)'s language that the ALJ may "impose additional requirements" [f]or good
cause," discusses the purposes of Rule 9(b), and concludes:
The . . . purposes of Rule 9(b) are equally important in an ITC hearing, and
inequitable conduct should be plead with the same high standard before the
Commission as the Federal Circuit requires in the district courts. Therefore, I
find that there is good cause to require the heightened pleading requirement of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) when a respondent pleads an affirmative defense of
unenforceability based upon inequitable conduct.
Id.
179. 19 C.F.R. § 210.19.
180. See, e.g., Certain Cold Cathode Fluorescent Lamp ("CCFL") Inverter Circuits &
Prods. Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-666, USITC Order No. 15, 2009 WL
2427112, at *4 (July 17, 2009) ("Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides guidance to the Commission in determining whether intervention in a particular
investigation is appropriate."); Certain Sucralose, Sweeteners Containing Sucralose, &
Related Intermediate Compounds Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-604, USITC Order No. 7,
2007 WL 3247997, at *2. (July 25, 2007) ("The Commission generally follows the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in determining whether intervention in a particular
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might not otherwise apply rules from the FRCP, the parties may agree
that certain procedures will be governed by federal practice.1 8 1 Again,
when the ITC looks to district court procedures in these instances, it is
not uncommon for it to also look to the corresponding case law 182 and, as
a result, introduce the potential for circularity.
iii. Guidance from the FRCP
Even when ALJs do not directly apply rules from the FRCP, and
neither statutes nor rules dictate it, they frequently turn to the FRCP and
associated case law for guidance. For example, ITC initial
determinations have stated that summary determination is "analogous to
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"'1 83 and relied directly on
the case law establishing the standards and burden-shifting schemes used
in district courts.184 They have also looked to the FRCP with respect to
electronic discovery.185  Similarly, while the portions of the FRCP
matter is appropriate."); Certain Baseband Processor Chips & Chipsets, Transmitter &
Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, & Prods. Containing Same, Including
Cellular Tel. Handsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Order No. 27, 2006 WL418762, at
*2 (Feb. 15, 2006) (stating the same).
181. See, e.g., Certain Multimedia Display & Navigation Devices & Sys.,
Components Thereof, & Prods. Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-694, USITC
Order No. 11, 2010 WL 575753, at *3 (Feb. 12, 2010) ("By agreement of the parties,
resolution of any issues related to claims that privileged documents and/or information
have been inadvertently disclosed shall be governed by the procedures set forth in Rule
26(b)(5)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Certain Variable Speed Wind
Turbines & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-641, USITC Order No. 9, 2008 WL
3990875, at *3 (Aug. 26, 2008) (stating the same); Certain Lighting Control Devices
Including Dimmer Switches and/or Switches & Parts Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-599,
USITC Order No. 5, 2007 WL 1571047, at *1 (May 24, 2007) (stating the same).
182. See, e.g., Certain Devices for Mobile Data Commc'n, Inv. No. 337-TA-809,
USITC Order No. 11, 2011 WL 6826778, at *3 (Dec. 23, 2011) (citing Ferguson
Beauregard/Logic Controls, Inc. v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326-27, 1328-29 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc)) (discussing the pleading standards in district court).
183. Certain Integrated Circuits, Chipsets, & Prods. Containing Same Including
Televisions, Media Players, & Cameras, Inv. No. 337-TA-709, USITC Order No. 34,
2011 WL 140501, at *1 (Jan. 5, 2011).
184. See id.; Certain Rubber Antidegradants, Antidegradant Intermediates, & Prods.
Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-652, USITC Order No. 9, 2008 WL 5208701, at
*16 (Sept. 12, 2008). ALJs have also described Rule 11 as analogous to Commission
Rule 210.4. See Certain Point of Sale Terminals & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-524, USITC Order No. 63, 2007 WL 506522, at *10 (Feb. 6, 2007) (describing and
relying on case law regarding Rule 11 to determine whether sanctions were appropriate).
185. See, e.g., Certain Cold Cathode Fluorescent Lamp ("CCFL") Inverter Circuits &
Prods. Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-666, USITC Order No. 28, 2009 WL
3155263, at *3 (Sept. 16, 2009) (internal citations omitted) ("The Commission Rules are
not specific with respect to electronic discovery. In such situations, the Commission may
look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance.").
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governing subpoenas in federal district courts "do not strictly apply to
[ITC] subpoena practice under rule 210.32, administrative law judges
and parties have looked to federal cases interpreting Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 45 at times for guidance.'
' 86
As argued above, administrative law principles suggest that the
Federal Circuit should exercise independent judgment on review-either
reviewing de novo or granting Skidmore deference-when the ITC has
interpreted portions of § 337 or the Commission Rules that incorporate
the FRCP, or when the ITC has looked to the FRCP or associated case
law in making a decision. This, in turn, means that the Federal Circuit
would be exercising independent judgment in interpreting the relevant
portions of the FRCP.187  In contrast, the Federal Circuit defers to
regional circuits on these same rules of the FRCP on appeal from district
courts. For instance, in district court appeals, the Federal Circuit has
explicitly stated that it defers to regional circuit law on the propriety of
imposing sanctions under Rule 37188 and under Rule 11.189 It has
similarly stated that it defers to regional circuit law when reviewing
district court rulings under Rule 60(b) to relieve a party from a final
judgment.190 The Federal Circuit also defers when reviewing the denial
of a motion to intervene,'9' and when reviewing an order quashing a
subpoena.92  Indeed, although the Federal Circuit has not had an
opportunity to explicitly address whether it will defer to regional circuit
law on each particular portion of the FRCP adopted by the ITC, the
Federal Circuit has made the blanket statement that it defers on all
186. Certain Adjustable Keyboard Support Sys. & Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-670, USITC Order No. 11, 2009 WL 2805215, at *2 n.5 (Aug. 26, 2009) (citing
Certain Lens-Fitted Film Packages, Inv. No. 337-TA-406, USITC Order No. 12, 1998
WL 797935 (Aug. 20, 1998); Certain Recordable Compact Discs & Rewritable Compact
Discs, Inv. No. 337-TA-474, USITC Order No. 9, 2002 WL 31939110, at *2 (Dec. 23,
2002).
187. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1288
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Seal-Flex Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836,
845 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); DH Tech., Inc. v. Synergystex Int'l, 154 F.3d 1333, 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
189. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1351 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1991),
cert denied, 505 U.S. 1205 (1992); Refac Int'l v. Hitachi, Ltd., 921 F.2d 1247, 1253-54
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
190. See, e.g., Am. Standard, Inc. v. Harden Indus., No. 91-1391, 1992 WL 175956,
at *2 (Fed. Cir. July 28, 1992) (applying Ninth Circuit law); Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech
Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (applying Tenth Circuit law).
191. See, e.g., Haworth, Inc. v. Steelcase, Inc., 12 F.3d 1090, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
192. See Heat & Control, Inc..v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1022 n.4 (Fed.




interpretations of the FRCP.1 93 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
if the issues arose on appeal from a district court, the Federal Circuit
would indeed defer on the vast majority, if not all, of the rules.
iv. Other Procedural Issues
The Federal Circuit's power, in addition to diverging on procedural
issues involving the FRCP, diverges on other procedural issues not
directly addressed by § 337 or the Commission Rules. On these issues,
like those involving the FRCP, the Federal Circuit is likely to exercise
independent judgment on appeal from the ITC but defer to the regional
circuits on appeal from district courts. One such example is attorney
disqualification. When this issue has arisen in the ITC, the ITC has
looked to the Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7194 to determine
whether attorneys should be disqualified.95 It seems likely that if the
Federal Circuit were to review a § 337 determination involving this
issue, it would exercise independent judgment rather than defer to the
ITC. In contrast, on appeal from district courts, the Federal Circuit
defers, reviewing disqualification under regional circuit law. 196 Another
example of the Federal Circuit's divergence on procedural issues is
illustrated in the Genentech cases discussed above.'97 When the Federal
Circuit addresses the scope of attorney-client privilege on appeal from
the ITC, it does not appear to defer to the ITC and thus creates Federal
193. See, e.g., Wexell v. Komar Indus., 18 F.3d 916, 919 (Fed Cir. 1994) ("This court
applies the law of the pertinent regional circuit when the precise issue to be addressed
involves an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Biodex Corp. v.
Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (describing the Federal
Circuit's practice as having "been to defer to regional circuit law when the precise issue
involves an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the local rules of the
district court").
194. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2013).
195. See, e.g., Certain Electronic Imaging Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-726, USITC
Order No. 6, 2010 WL 4786589, at *3 (Sept. 1, 2010) ("In recent years, the Commission
has looked to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct for guidance in determining
whether to disqualify counsel.") (citing Certain Baseband Processor Chips & Chipsets,
Transmitter & Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, & Prods. Containing Same,
Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Order No. 29,
2006 WL 739660, at *9 (March 9, 2006); Network Interface Cards & Access Points for
Use in Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Wireless Local Area Networks & Prods.
Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-455, USITC Order No. 26, 2001 WL 893287, at *4
(Aug. 2, 2001)).
196. See Atasi Corp. v. Seagate Tech., 847 F.2d 826, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also
Picker Int'l Inc. v. Varian Assocs., 869 F.2d 578, 580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Telectronics
Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 836 F.2d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
197. See supra notes 44-73 and accompanying text.
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Circuit law, while on appeal from the district courts, it largely defers to
regional circuit court law.'
98
III. IMPLICATIONS: MUTUALLY UNSTABLE REGIMES
As described above, there are both areas of alignment and
divergence between the Federal Circuit's deference regimes on appeal
from the district courts and the ITC. Neither alignment nor divergence
alone is necessarily problematic, but in some areas of law, the conceptual
inconsistency between the Federal Circuit's role on appeal from the ITC
and district courts indicates uncertainty or ambivalence about the proper
role of the Federal Circuit in developing law outside its core area of
expertise. On the one hand, its deference in appeals from district courts
seems to reflect a view of the Federal Circuit as having limited
competency outside of patent law. But on the other hand, the court's
control over similar issues in the ITC undermines this traditional
explanation for Federal Circuit choice-of-law doctrine, and suggests that
the Federal Circuit may in fact be competent to supervise the district
courts on these issues. It seems suspect that the Federal Circuit would
lack the institutional competence to decide these issues on appeal from
district courts, but at the same time it would be competent to do so on
appeal from the ITC. This dichotomy seems particularly suspect given
the general assumption, reflected in the Administrative Procedure Act
and throughout administrative law, that agencies are specialized
institutions that should receive greater deference.'99 Moreover, even if
Federal Circuit deference to regional circuits is justified by reasons other
than lack of institutional competence, the circularities generated by the
combined regimes suggests that they are mutually unstable.
This Part proposes one possible approach to help harmonize these
two regimes, with the caveat that there may be no simple fix to this
mutual instability and that any complete solution would surely merit an
article of its own. Any changes to how the Federal Circuit reviews the
ITC or the district courts would have reverberating effects, and thus, it
may be impossible to harmonize the deference regimes without
fundamentally altering other principles of appellate or administrative
198. Compare Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1418
(Fed. Cir. 1997), with In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
1996). But the Federal Circuit does not defer on all issues involving attorney-client
privilege. See, e.g., In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 804 (Fed. Cir.
2000) ("[W]hether the invention record is protected by the attorney-client privilege ...
clearly implicates substantive patent law."). See generally Field, supra note 1, at 652
(discussing the Federal Circuit's inconsistent approach to choice-of-law in attorney-client
privilege).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001).
[Vol. 119:4
FEDERAL CIRCUIT DEFERENCE
review as they apply in intellectual property cases. Moreover, even if
any change could in theory resolve the mutual instability, the
implementation of any such change by judges or Congress might be
unrealistic to expect, for practical or political reasons. That said, the
particular combination proposed here is a starting point for thinking
about how to stabilize the regimes in relation to each other, while taking
into account comparative institutional competence, uniformity and forum
shopping, and practical considerations for litigators.
A. Substantive Law. Increased Deference to the ITC
On issues of substantive law, the conflict between deference
regimes could be addressed by the Federal Circuit granting greater
deference to the ITC. If this were the case, the Federal Circuit would
defer on non-patent substantive issues on appeal from both the ITC and
the district courts, while on patent issues, it would defer on appeal from
the ITC and use independent judgment on appeal from the district courts.
Although a full analysis of whether the Federal Circuit can or should
grant Chevron deference to the ITC's substantive determinations is
beyond the scope of this Article, there is a reasonable argument that such
deference would be not only doctrinally permissible, but also desirable
for certain normative reasons beyond the inconsistencies outlined here.
Under the U.S. Supreme Court's 2001 decision in United States v.
Mead Corp. ,200 Chevron deference applies when the agency has been
delegated power to administer a statute through rulemaking or
adjudication, and the agency action is an exercise of that authority.20 1 In
the context of the ITC's patent validity and enforceability determinations
under § 337, Sapna Kumar has previously argued that he determinations
meet the first criteria of Mead because § 3 37(c) states that determinations
of exclusion "shall be made on the record after notice and opportunity for
a hearing in conformity with the [APA]," which are the "magic words"
designating formal adjudication under §§ 556 and 557 of the APA.2 °2
If the ITC's determinations under § 337 meet the delegation criteria
of Mead, the next question is whether the ITC's substantive law
decisions are made under § 337. For patent validity and enforceability
determinations, Kumar argues that these decisions are made under the
Tariff Act, making them eligible for Chevron deference.°3 If patent
200. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
201. Id. at 226-31; City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013).
202. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1569.
203. See id. at 1573-75. If these decision were instead made under the Patent Act,
they would be ineligible for Chevron deference. See id. at 1569-75. This would be the
case even if the ITC were found to "administer" the Patent Act, since the USPTO also
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determinations are made under § 337, then other determinations, such as
those regarding copyright and trademark, seemingly should be, too. One
possible counterpoint to this argument, however, is that there is a
structural difference between how § 337 references patents and these
other intellectual property rights. Whereas § 337 does not explicitly
reference the Patent Act, it does explicitly reference the Copyright Act
and Trademark Act.2 °4 Furthermore, in contrast to patent determinations
by the ITC, non-patent intellectual property determinations do have
preclusive effect on courts.20 5 Kumar argues that the failure of ITC
patent determinations to bind federal courts suggests that they are distinct
from interpretations of the Patent Act;20 6 thus, following this logic, ITC
determinations related to other rights might be made under their
respective statutes, rather than under the Tariff Act.
Assuming a doctrinal case for Chevron deference can be made for
non-patent substantive determinations, the normative argument is just as
strong, if not stronger, than in the case of patent determinations. The
most commonly cited rationales for Chevron deference to agencies'
interpretations of statutes include agencies' greater expertise,
congressional intent for such deference, congressional intent to delegate
legislative power, and the greater political accountability of agencies
than courts.20 7 Kumar argues that Chevron deference to the ITC's patent
validity and enforceability determinations is normatively desirable
because the ITC is better at fact-finding and is politically accountable;
and furthermore, because although both the ITC and Federal Circuit are
somewhat specialized with respect to patent law, the ITC is particularly
knowledgeable regarding a narrow range of technologies that are
repeatedly litigated in the ITC.2 °8
In the context of the ITC's non-patent intellectual property
determinations, these arguments regarding fact-finding and political
accountability apply equally well. If the Federal Circuit defers to
regional circuits on these issues on appeal from the district courts, the
ITC's comparative institutional competence in non-patent law is even
greater than it is in patent law. While the ITC sees fewer cases involving
administers the Patent Act; neither agency would then be eligible for Chevron deference.
See id. at 1569-70.
204. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i), (C) (2012); Kumar, supra note 2, at 1577.
205. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1573 & n.133.
206. See id. at 1573-75.
207. See Note, Justifying the Chevron Doctrine: Insights from the Rule of Lenity, 123
HARV. L. REv. 2043, 2045-48 (2010). The Note argues that the last rationale is the only
one that adequately justifies the doctrine. See id at 2048.
208. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1586.
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non-patent intellectual property rights than patent rights,2 °9 it still has
more independent experience than a Federal Circuit that defers.
Although there are reasons why Chevron deference might be
desirable and doctrinally permissible, there would surely be hurdles in
implementing this in practice. The Federal Circuit would be unlikely to
grant Chevron deference to the ITC on either patent or non-patent issues,
given its historical resistance to giving either the USPTO or ITC the
deference typically accorded to agencies under administrative law.
21 0
But if such a change could be implemented, doing so would help resolve
the inconsistencies between the deference regimes in appeals from the
ITC and district courts on substantive issues, and would be better aligned
with administrative law jurisprudence in reflecting the assumption of an
agency's greater expertise.
B. Procedural Law: Undermining the Justifications for Deference
For procedural rules involving the FRCP, it would be counter to the
underlying principles of administrative law to grant deference to the
ITC's interpretation of the federal rules. Instead, the conflict between
the deference regimes could be addressed by no longer deferring to
regional circuits. If the Federal Circuit exercised independent judgment
on procedural matters in district court appeals, the inconsistencies
described above involving procedural deference would be avoided.
This effect is illustrated by a procedural issue on which the Federal
Circuit has already determined that it does not defer to regional circuits:
preliminary injunctions. In the ITC, a complainant can make a request
for temporary relief under § 337(e) or (f). 2 11 Under § 337(e)(3), the ITC
can grant temporary relief to "the same extent as preliminary injunctions
and temporary restraining orders may be granted under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.212  The regulations in 19 C.F.R. § 210.52 further
specify that the ITC determines whether to grant temporary relief by
apply[ing] the standards the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit uses in determining whether to affirm lower court decisions
granting preliminary injunctions. The motion for temporary relief
accordingly must contain a detailed statement of specific facts
bearing on the factors the Federal Circuit has stated that a U.S.
District Court must consider in granting a preliminary injunction.2 13
209. See supra note 26.
210. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1566-68; Motomura, supra note 2, at 857.
211. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)-(f) (2012).
212. Id. § 1337(e)(3).
213. 19 C.F.R. § 210.52(a) (2014).
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If the Federal Circuit treated the grant of a preliminary injunction as
a procedural matter for which it applied regional circuit law, the ITC
regulations would invoke a circularity similar to that discussed above
regarding motions to quash subpoenas.14 That is, the regulations require
the ITC to apply the standards used by the Federal Circuit in district
court appeals. But if the Federal Circuit deferred to the regional circuit,
there would be no such "Federal Circuit" standard for the ITC to apply.
And if the Federal Circuit reviewed an ITC decision, it presumably
would be reviewing de novo the regional circuit law to which it had
deferred in reviewing lower court decisions. This potential circularity,
however, is avoided because the Federal Circuit applies its own law in
reviewing district court decisions regarding preliminary injunctions.215 If
the Federal Circuit similarly developed its own law on the other
procedural issues described above, the conflicts and potential
circularities would be avoided.216
214. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
215. Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 952-53
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (reasoning that the court "treat[s] the application of the factors-that is,
the determination of whether a preliminary injunction should be granted or denied-as a
procedural issue" to which the court applies the law of the Federal Circuit because "when
the question on appeal is one involving substantive matters unique to the Federal Circuit,
we apply to related procedural issues the law of this circuit").
However, the actual procedure by which a preliminary injunction is granted is not
determined under Federal Circuit law. In Chemlawn Services Corp. v. GNC Pumps, Inc.,
GNC Pumps appealed an order of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas granting Chemlawn a preliminary injunction. Chemlawn Servs. v. GNC
Pumps, Inc., 823 F.2d 515, 515 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The Federal Circuit reversed the
preliminary injunction because "it was not properly supported by findings of fact and
conclusions of law as required by FED.R.Civ.P. 52(a)." Id. In reviewing the district
court's grant of the preliminary injunction, the Federal Circuit said that the issue under
Rule 52(a) concerning whether the preliminary injunction was accompanied by the
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law constituted a procedural issue, and
therefore, the Federal Circuit deferred to the law of the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 517.
216. There are other examples of procedural issues where the Federal Circuit applies
its own law, see, e.g., supra notes 96-99, and the Federal Circuit seems to be becoming
more aggressive in doing so. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 100, at § 5.3. Not all of
the issues, however, can also arise in the ITC.
This Article is not the first to question the Federal Circuit's deference to regional
circuits on procedural matters. The rule and its application have been sharply critiqued
for its uncertainty: it has been described as "seemingly straight-forward" but "elusive in
practice." Moore, supra note 1, at 800. The Federal Circuit's numerous formulations of
the rule have been cited as evidence of the rule's ill-definition. See McEldowney, supra
note 1, at 1646-47; see also Charles L. Gholz, Choice of Law in the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 309, 315 (1985) (predicting that
there would be a "great deal of avoidable uncertainty in at least the near term" while the
Federal Circuit categorized issues as those on which the court would defer or not).
Further, the outcome of applying any particular formulation of the rule can depend
on how narrowly or broadly the court defines the issue. See Field, supra note 1, at 652
(arguing that the Federal Circuit can manipulate whether it applies its own law or
regional circuit law under its choice-of-law rules simply by defining the issue more
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Ending Federal Circuit deference to regional circuits on procedural
matters is particularly appealing because increases in ITC litigation not
broadly or more narrowly); HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 100, at § 5.3 (discussing how
the Federal Circuit has reached disparate outcomes regarding deference on antitrust
issues by defining them more broadly or narrowly); Schaffner, supra note 1, at 1178,
1201 (criticizing the court for treating some issues as unique to patent law that are in fact
unique to patent litigation and for treating some issues as related to substantive patent law
when they are actually only factual matters). Moreover, in some instances the Federal
Circuit appears to fail to follow its own articulation of the rule, even ignoring the
existence of the rule altogether. See Field, supra note 1, at 650-68. The effects of the
rule have also been critiqued as limiting the Federal Circuit's ability to provide
uniformity and to exercise independent judgment, as well as encouraging forum
shopping. See, e.g., Gholz, supra, at 314 (arguing that the doctrine would "revive the
forum shopping that creation of the Federal Circuit was designed to eliminate" because
lawyers would try to litigate in district courts within circuits with the most favorable law
on issues on which the Federal Circuit would defer); Schaffner, supra note 1, at 1178
(arguing that the doctrine "too severely limits the independent judgment" of the court and
"inhibits the court's ability to provide uniform guidance to patent policy and the patent-
related business activities of litigants," while the doctrine simultaneously allows the court
to "exercise independent judgment too broadly over certain procedural issues given the
interests of the regional courts").
These same scholars have also suggested a range of possible revisions to the Federal
Circuit's rule of deference, including several proposals for new tests by which to
determine whether the Federal Circuit should defer on an issue or not. See, e.g.,
McEldowney, supra note 1, at 1675 (proposing that the Federal Circuit determine
whether to defer to regional circuits by placing procedural issues on an "essential
relationship spectrum" and only apply its own law on issues that "directly affect[] the
predictability of validity and infringement interpretations"); Schaffher, supra note 1, at
1210 (proposing that the Federal Circuit apply its own law for "all legal issues that either
(1) impact upon the patent-related primary activity of the parties or (2) relate to patent
policy and thus invoke the expertise of the Federal Circuit's judgment"). Other scholars
instead argue that the rule should simply be dropped and that the Federal Circuit should,
like every other circuit court, be bound only by its own precedent and U.S. Supreme
Court precedent. Most commentators making such an argument have done so with
respect to procedural issues. See, e.g., Field, supra note 1, at 646 ("[T]he Federal Circuit
should apply its own law to all procedural issues, regardless of whether these issues are
related to substantive patent law."); Karol, supra note 1, at 2, 27 (proposing that "the
Federal Circuit cast the Rule aside and join its sister circuits in explicating federal
procedure as such issues arise in the cases before the court" because the court should not
be allowed to "systematically refus[e] to interpret a question of federal law presented
before it, regardless of its appellate jurisdiction to review the issue"); Moore, supra note
1, at 801 ("1 find the Federal Circuit's current choice of law rules unsatisfying and believe
this avenue is ripe for further research into whether a blackletter rule-wherein Federal
Circuit law would apply to all procedural issues in patent cases-might be superior to the
current choice of law rules."). However, at least one scholar has suggested that the rule
be dropped with respect to both procedural and substantive issues. See Gholz, supra, at
317. Gholz recommends that Congress add a new section to Title 28 to address Federal
Circuit choice-of-law. The new section would state that in patent cases appealed to the
Federal Circuit:
[N]either the district court nor the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall be bound by the law of the regional circuit court in whose
circuit the district court is located as to either patent or non-patent issues of
Federal law and as to either substantive or procedural Federal law.
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only make the inconsistencies between deference regimes more apparent,
but also undermine some of the primary justifications for regional circuit
deference in the first place. The traditional justifications for deference to
regional circuits fall into two categories, broadly speaking: those related
to the Federal Circuit's specialized competency and those related to
doctrinal uniformity-both of which are made less persuasive by
increased litigation in the ITC.
1. Specialized Competency
The Federal Circuit's deference to the regional circuits on matters
not closely related to its exclusive jurisdiction has been suggested to
reflect the Federal Circuit's lesser competence with respect to those areas
of law.217  In one of the first cases in which the Federal Circuit
articulated this deference rule, the court reasoned that independent
judgment over non-patent issues might "usurp for itself a broad guiding
role for the district courts beyond its mandate to contribute to uniformity
of the substantive law of patents.21 8  This reflects the general view
sometimes taken that the Federal Circuit, as a court with more
specialized jurisdiction, has in turn more specialized expertise that
should limit its power outside that specialization.
Despite the court's own articulation of this view, such a
presumption of Federal Circuit incompetency is contrary to
Congressional intent at the time of the court's creation, as evidenced by
the legislative history and by the court's diverse docket.219 Furthermore,
even if any specialized competency of the Federal Circuit could have
been a legitimate justification for deference to regional circuits at one
217. See supra notes 78-79.
218. Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Grp., Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1984), overruled
by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Note
that the application of regional circuit law in Atari involved a non-patent substantive
issue, not a procedural issue-the Federal Circuit deferred to Seventh Circuit law
regarding copyright infringement. Id. at 1440.
219. See Karol, supra note 1, at 38-39 ("Congress went out of its way to assure
doubters that the Federal Circuit would not become a specialized captive of the patent
industry, in part because it would have a diverse docket allowing it to handle 'a broad
range of legal issues."') (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 19 (1981)); id. at 39 ("The idea
that the Federal Circuit might be on a different tier from other circuits is directly contrary
to the intent professed in its founding legislation.") (citing S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2-3
(1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12-13). Concern that the court might
become too specialized motivated, in part, the addition of a number of non-patent areas to
the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989). The Federal Circuit has
jurisdiction over certain tort cases against the United States; appeals from the Court of
Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, and the Merit Systems Protection
Board, in addition to § 337 investigations in the ITC; certain dispute resolutions,
economic measures, and other agency actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
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point, the rise of intellectual property litigation in the ITC undermines its
legitimacy. The Federal Circuit's development of doctrine in a range of
procedural issues in § 337 appeals belies any alleged incompetence to
supervise the district courts on these same matters.
2. Uniformity and Forum Shopping
Concerns related to uniformity have been another common
justification for Federal Circuit deference to regional circuits. It has been
suggested that because district court judges and attorneys are familiar
with the law of their regional districts, forcing them to apply different
rules in cases that will be appealed to the Federal Circuit would be
inconvenient or difficult
220 and force them to "serve[] two masters.,
221
Such justifications have been repeatedly invoked by the Federal Circuit;
for example, the court has stated that deference to regional circuits
promotes "the general policy of minimizing confusion and conflicts in
the federal judicial system.,
222
Despite the theoretical risk, however, the actual difficulty or
confusion may be minimal.223  Meaningful conflicts between
interpretations of federal procedural law are rare,224 and furthermore,
most patent litigators practice nationally, not locally.225  One
220. See Karol, supra note 1, at 27-28 (discussing this justification for deference on
procedural rules).
221. See Atari, 747 F.2d at 1439 ("It would be at best unfair to hold in this case that
the district court, at risk of error, should have 'served two masters', or that it should have
looked, Janus-like, in two directions in its conduct of that judicial process".).
222. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1573-76 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (per curiam). The court also expressed this view in International Medical
Prosthetics Research Associates, where the Federal Circuit said that it would follow
Ninth Circuit law on attorney disqualification because of the need to "maintain a
uniformity of guidance available to individual district courts in such purely procedural
matters as disqualification." In re Int'l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., 739 F.2d 618,
620 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In International Medical, the court reasoned that:
Dealing daily with such procedural questions in all types of cases, a district
court cannot and should not be asked to answer them one way when the appeal
on the merits will go to the regional circuit in which the district court is located
and in a different way when the appeal will come to this circuit.
Id.
223. See Karol, supra note 1, at 28.
224. See id. Karol explains:
[Blecause the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are uniform across districts, the
vast majority of procedural decisions made in the federal system are not
impacted by the location of the district court. Meaningful conflicts among
regional interpretations of matters concerning federal procedure are the
exception, not the rule. To the extent that conflicts in interpretation do exist,
moreover, it is rare that they are material.
Id.
225. See id. at 29 (citing Gholz, supra note 216, at 316).
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commentator has suggested that "[i]t is somewhat ironic, as well as a bit
disingenuous, to maintain the Rule of Deference for the benefit of
practitioners who themselves have no sense of geographic boundaries
' 226
and that it is probably more burdensome for patent litigators to have
regional variation.2 7 For judges, applying different law in cases that will
be appealed to the Federal Circuit may create some additional work. But
federal judges are already accustomed to applying different laws because
of other choice-of-law rules, most notably when sitting in diversity
jurisdiction.228 In those cases, judges apply state substantive law and
some state procedural law. It may be slightly less natural at first for
district court judges to apply different federal procedural law when
sitting in federal question jurisdiction, but this is unlikely to be a real
hurdle. Moreover, in almost every instance, litigators and judges will
know from the beginning of a case whether the appeal will be to the
Federal Circuit or the regional circuit; it is not as though they must
conduct the case not knowing which precedent to follow.
229
These reasons to question the uniformity rationale for deference are
all the more true with the rise of § 337 actions in the ITC. Litigators in
intellectual property cases are frequently specialists in this area of law
and are thus more likely to litigate intellectual property cases in multiple
jurisdictions-including the ITC-rather than multiple types of cases in
one jurisdiction. Of course, attorneys must expect to make many
accommodations for fundamental differences between litigation in the
district courts and the ITC, and indeed, the differences are some of the
key drivers for increased ITC litigation. But uniformity of procedural
law for lawyers already litigating in the ITC is a particularly unsatisfying
justification for deference to regional circuit courts in district courts
appeals. Given the many areas of similarity between issues arising in the
two forums, if anything, it would seem easier for lawyers if the Federal
Circuit created the law for district court litigation, thus making it more
likely to match the law in the ITC.
Closely tied to the uniformity rationale for deference is the idea that
the Federal Circuit's deference to regional circuit law can be justified as
a way to decrease forum shopping. The Federal Circuit has expressed
this view, describing its creation as driven by the congressional goal of
minimizing forum shopping230 and voicing concerns that not deferring to
regional circuit law would "encourage forum shopping by seeming to
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See Gholz, supra note 216, at 316.
229. See id.
230. Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Grp., Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1984), overruled
by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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provide an escape" from the regional circuit.23' That is, litigants could
avoid unfavorable regional circuit law by including a patent claim.232
Several commentators, however, have argued that the forum-
shopping justification is questionable. They suggest that whether or not
the Federal Circuit defers to regional circuits' law simply determines
which type of forum shopping there will be, not whether it will exist.
233
If the Federal Circuit creates its own interpretations of federal law, there
may be forum shopping between the Federal Circuit and regional circuit
courts. In contrast, if the Federal Circuit defers, there may be forum
shopping between the circuits.234
Again, rising litigation in the ITC further weakens any forum
shopping-based justifications for deference to regional circuits. Creating
Federal Circuit law for cases arising in the ITC, but not applying it to
cases arising in the federal district courts, only adds to the possibilities
from which to choose the most favorable law. Choosing to litigate in the
ITC is now a primary form of forum shopping in patent disputes. The
incentives to forum shop in the ITC235 are arguably stronger than any
incentives to forum shop amongst regional circuits or between them and
the Federal Circuit.236 Although forum shopping in the ITC is unlikely to
231. Id.
232. See Abramson, supra note 78, at 4-5 ("First, adopting the law of the regional
circuits for non-patent matters avoids self-appropriation-the plaintiff cannot, by
including a patent claim in the complaint, escape the law of the regional circuit as to non-
patent-related matters in the complaint.") (citing Atari, 747 F.2d at 1433-34, 1438).
Abramson observes that in Atari, the court "not[ed] [that] Congress expressed concerns
that plaintiffs might try to manipulate jurisdiction by adding a frivolous patent claim to
avoid the law of a regional circuit." Id. at 5 n.21.
233. Schaffner, supra note 1, at 1194.
234. Id.; see also Gholz, supra note 216, at 314 (arguing that deferring to regional
circuits revives the same forum shopping opportunities that led to the creation of the
Federal Circuit, since litigants will simply go back to the pre-Federal Circuit practice of
attempting to litigate in the circuit with the most favorable law). One commentator has
even argued that deference to regional circuits will cause a kind of reverse forum
shopping-if the Federal Circuit is required to apply a regional circuit's law, a party to
whom the regional circuit's law is favorable will actually prefer to be in the Federal
Circuit, since the law will likely be applied without modification. Dreyfuss, supra note
219, at 42. If, instead, the party has its case heard in the regional circuit, there is a risk
that the law could be modified or adapted against the party's interests. Id. Charles Gholz
has also recognized this problem. See Gholz, supra note 216, at 313-14.
235. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
236. Indeed, one scholar in 2010 noted that the ITC had eclipsed any U.S. district
court in the number of full patent adjudications carried out per year. Menell, supra note
29, at 79 ("The ITC now conducts more full patent adjudications on an annual basis than
any district court in the nation."). About half of ITC investigations go to judgment,
compared to far fewer in the district courts. See supra note 25.
The incentives to forum shop in the ITC are also easier to act on, since jurisdiction is
easier to establish (as long as there is importation), particularly with the increasing
difficulty of keeping cases in the Eastern District of Texas, see Li Zhu, Note, Taking Off:
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be eliminated by having the Federal Circuit apply its own procedural law
in district court appeals, it could reduce some of the incentives by
increasing the uniformity of procedural law across the courts and agency.
Moreover, ending Federal Circuit deference to regional circuits only on
procedural, not substantive, law strikes a balance between the types of
forum shopping. Inter-circuit forum shopping is most obviously
problematic in substantive law. For example, it seems problematic that a
copyright claim might be decided one way if decided alone by the
regional circuit and another way if decided under the Federal Circuit's
pendent jurisdiction based on a patent claim. Thus, retaining deference
to regional circuits on substantive issues avoids such forum shopping,
while ending deference on procedural law addresses the conceptual
conflict and any doctrinal conflicts between the ITC and district courts
on procedural issues.
Of course, Federal Circuit development of its own procedural law
would have broader effects than just reducing conceptual and doctrinal
inconsistencies generated by litigation in the ITC. Initially, there would
be practical concerns-in particular, a void of guiding precedent in
district court patent cases. But just because the Federal Circuit would
not be deferring to regional circuit law would not mean that it could not
look to other circuits for persuasive precedent. Given that there are
relatively few points of actual doctrinal conflict between circuits,237
litigants and district court judges would have reasonably good
predictions as to the law that the Federal Circuit would apply in most
cases of first impression. 8  In addition, the uncertainty of a lack of
guiding precedent would almost surely be compensated for by the
elimination of the current uncertainty as to whether an issue is one on
which the Federal Circuit will defer. In any case, problems of this sort
would diminish with time.239  But beyond these initial hurdles, there
would obviously be lasting trade-offs if the Federal Circuit developed its
own law on all procedural issues. In particular, it would certainly revive
some of the forum shopping concerns that the deference was meant to
Recent Changes to Venue Transfer of Patent Litigation in the Rocket Docket, 11 MiNN.
J.L. ScI. & TECH. 901, 910-12 (2010), and because there can be parallel litigation
between the ITC and district courts. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 224.
238. The current system requires practitioners and district court judges to deal with
voids in precedent as well, though admittedly less often. In the current system, there is
sometimes no controlling authority in the regional circuit on an issue, and the Federal
Circuit must then predict how the circuit would rule. See e.g., Concept Design Elecs. &
Mfg. v. Duplitronics, Inc., No. 96-1065, 1996 WL 729637, at *4 n.3 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19,
1996).
239. See generally Moore, supra note 1, at 800-01 (addressing the critique that if the
Federal Circuit stops deferring to regional circuit law there will be a void of precedent).
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address. But these concerns, like concerns about a lack of guiding
precedent, are also mitigated to some extent by the fact that in the vast
majority of situations, circuit courts have relatively uniform
interpretations of federal law, and the Federal Circuit would likely join in
these interpretations.
CONCLUSION
The United States patent system is particularly interesting to study
because litigation can occur both through Article III courts and Article I
tribunals. Traditionally, the Fedeial Circuit has taken a more
circumscribed view of its own role vis-A-vis the other appellate courts
and has deferred on a number of issues outside its area of specialization
in appeals from district courts. This is in stark contrast to the Federal
Circuit's stance in reviewing agencies, where it has consistently
demonstrated its unwillingness to defer to either the ITC or the USPTO,
sometimes in direct contravention of administrative law principles.
Rather than critique either of the Federal Circuit's deference regimes
alone, this Article instead looks at them in tandem, focusing on an
unrecognized conflict between them.
As intellectual property-related litigation in the ITC increases, the
Federal Circuit is developing a body of law to govern these disputes. But
as this body of law grows, it increasingly includes issues on which the
Federal Circuit declines to apply its own law in the context of district
court appeals. With the same issues being litigated in both forums,
conceptual inconsistencies are likely to be more visible, and any
doctrinal inconsistencies may be more likely to appear problematic,
particularly if they lead to divergent outcomes between the two forums in
the same controversy. The circularities caused by the conflict, in which
the Federal Circuit may ultimately review de novo its prior deference to a
regional circuit, are particularly troubling. It seems suspect that the
Federal Circuit would defer in the first instance in a district court appeal,
if it may later review the same issue without deference when it arises
from the agency. This is particularly true given the underlying principle
of administrative law that agencies receive greater deference as
specialized institutions.
The current distribution of power is thus inconsistent with principles
of administrative law and appellate review, and the conflict between the
two deference regimes destabilizes both and raises questions about the
proper scope of the Federal Circuit's power. Ultimately, however,
finding the right resolution to this instability may depend on broader
issues regarding the roles we believe the Federal Circuit and the agencies
involved in patent-related proceedings should play in the broader system.
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